April 22, 2025
In the last decade, China has significantly strengthened its penetration in the Caribbean, driven by a strategic combination of economic investments, diplomatic initiatives, and infrastructure projects. In 2018, Trinidad and Tobago became the first island country to join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), followed by Suriname, Guyana, Dominica, Antigua and Barbuda, and Barbados. In 2019, the two largest economies in the Caribbean, Jamaica and the Dominican Republic, also joined.
The impact of this expansion has been significant. By 2023, direct investment from China in island countries reached $3.3 billion, while infrastructure contracts amounted to $32.2 billion.
For its part, the Washington D.C.-based think tank Inter-American Dialogue highlighted that, in 2022, among the 10 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean with the highest direct investment from China — in proportion to their gross domestic product — four are in the island region. Guyana topped the list, followed by Saint Lucia, while Jamaica and Suriname came fourth and fifth, with Peru in third place as the only exception outside the Caribbean.
File photo of the Freeport Container Port (FCP) in the Bahamas, January 31, 2008. The FCP opened in 1997 after China’s Hutchinson Port Holdings poured in $2.6 billion, the same year that the Bahamas cut ties with Taiwan and switched to Beijing. (Photo: jonworth/Creative Commons)
At a commercial level, growth has also been exponential. According to figures from the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, trade between China and the Caribbean went from $1 billion in 2002 to $8 billion in 2019, with a marked surplus for Beijing. A report by the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) highlighted that the Caribbean has become a destination for “cheap” Chinese products, and the region a key source of bauxite, gold, oil, and natural gas for Beijing.
Although Caribbean countries are experiencing unprecedented economic growth, various academic reports, think tanks, and experts warn that Beijing’s agenda transcends the “win-win” cooperation model it touts in its agreements. “Few Chinese projects in the Caribbean can really be considered ‘win-win’ agreements, largely due to Beijing’s often predatory approach and the marked asymmetry of power between state-backed Chinese companies — such as China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC), China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC), and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) — and the small and economically vulnerable governments negotiating these agreements,” Evan Ellis, an expert in Sino-Latin American relations and research professor of Latin American studies at the U.S War College Strategic Institute, told Diálogo.
Far from being a simple investment and development cooperation relationship, China’s presence in the Caribbean is part of a long-term strategy, where the economy is only the first phase of a broader model of domination. “We are not talking about a democratic country, but about companies that are part of a repressive system,” Ryan Berg, director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), told Diálogo.
Power architecture disguised as cooperation
Former Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago Keith Rowley, who resigned in early March, was not wrong when, after his country joined the BRI, he said to China: “We need your investments, and you need our location.” His statement, quoted in a Caribbean Investigative Journalism Network (CIJN) report, sums up the pragmatism with which small Caribbean states have welcomed Beijing’s growing influence.
Beyond its image as a paradise tourist destination, the Caribbean has strategic value as a logistics, financial, and commercial hub. Its access to key maritime routes makes it a fundamental link in China’s projection of global power, in a dynamic comparable to that observed in Southeast Asia, where Beijing has combined economic investment, diplomatic presence, and, potentially, military projection as part of its expansion strategy. “The Caribbean Sea lanes are comparable to strategic corridors such as the Strait of Malacca or the waters around Taiwan, where China has used trade and finance as tools of influence,” Ellis said.
Added to this is another determining factor: the diplomatic tug-of-war with Taiwan. Five of the 12 countries that still officially recognize Taipei are in this region, making the Caribbean a crucial arena in China’s geopolitical strategy. Experts say that Beijing has deployed a systematic diplomatic offensive to reduce the number of Taiwan’s allies, using economic incentives and promises of investment as pressure mechanisms. “The Caribbean has become a silent battlefield in China’s crusade to erode Taiwan’s diplomatic ties, a priority in Xi Jinping’s foreign policy,” Ellis added.
This panorama confirms that the presence of the Asian country in the Caribbean goes beyond strict economic cooperation and responds to a silent and meticulously designed and calculated power architecture. Experts have sounded the alarm, warning that, although the region has not received the same attention as South America, it represents the most fragile link in China’s regional power strategy.
“It’s difficult to find a region in Latin America that is more strategically important to Beijing, especially in the context of a possible future conflict, and yet receives so little attention and recognition,” Ellis points out. According to the expert, China has invested more capital in the Caribbean per capita than in any other part of Latin America.
An idea reinforced by Joseph Humire, executive director of the Center for a Secure Free Society, who stressed that: “China’s whole game is in the Caribbean. The Pacific is the entrance, but it will all end in the Caribbean,” he told Diálogo.
Loans and investment: China’s Trojan horse in the Caribbean Sea
File photo. Aerial view of English Harbour, Antigua, September 30, 2015. China has plans to set up a special economic zone in a pristine marine reserve in Antigua, potentially creating a state within a state, and underlining China’s ambitions in the region. (Photo: Jean-Pierre de Mann/robertharding via AFP)
A key part of China’s strategy in the Caribbean has been to consolidate its position as the region’s largest lender, with more than $8 billion granted over the last two decades, according to data from the Inter-American Dialogue. However, what at first glance appears to be an opportunity, experts say, is a dangerous debt scheme strengthening China’s influence, compromising the economic and political sovereignty of recipient nations.
For Gerard Johnson, a Trinidadian economist, Beijing clearly lends money for projects that other multilateral institutions would not approve or that would require years of analysis, because most are not viable or present considerable environmental or socioeconomic risks. “China’s financing is much faster and is delivered turnkey, but the costs in terms of institutional weakening are real,” Johnson told Central American investigative magazine Expediente Público.
This phenomenon has been particularly evident in Jamaica, considered the anchor of Beijing’s investments in the Caribbean. The country has received nearly $2 billion in government loans for strategic infrastructure projects and $3 billion in direct investment in key sectors such as bauxite mining and sugar production, according to data from the China-Latin America Finance Databases of the Inter-American Dialogue.
A revealing case is the Jamaica North South Highway, built by China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC) at a cost of $458 million, financed entirely by China Development Bank. As part of the agreement, the Jamaican government ceded to Beijing the rights to operate and collect tolls for 50 years, which not only guarantees a return on China’s investment, but also gives Beijing sustained control over a key piece of infrastructure on the island.
The economic and social impact of the highway has been the subject of debate. According to the Toll Authority, the toll cost, $16 for a 66-kilometer one-way trip, makes it inaccessible to most citizens, resulting in a highway Jamaicans cannot afford. “China seeks to position itself through strategic investments, while recipient countries face the hidden costs of these deals,” Ellis said.
Experts say that the small economies of the Caribbean lack the technical and financial resources to thoroughly evaluate contractual conditions or explore financing alternatives, which puts them at a disadvantage. In many cases, these negotiations have ended up favoring only Beijing’s interests at the expense of the recipient countries, which are trapped in debt schemes with minimal local job creation and clear foreign control over strategic assets.
An example of this is the Bahamas, where the China Exim Bank provided $2.5 billion to build the Baha Mar resort and casino, the largest in the Caribbean. During its construction, more than 8,000 work visas were issued to Chinese workers, Ellis told Diálogo, displacing thousands of qualified Bahamian workers. After declaring bankruptcy during its execution, the local partner was sidelined and China Construction America (CCA) took control, securing the infrastructure under conditions favorable to Beijing rather than to the local economy.
Even more worrisome is the lack of transparency in financial agreements, which makes it difficult for other international lenders to intervene in the event of a crisis. An alarming case is Suriname, whose external debt has reached $2.4 billion, with approximately 17 percent owed to China’s state-owned banks.
In mid-2023, amid a deep economic and social crisis that left Suriname unable to repay its loans, India agreed to restructure its debt. Beijing, on the other hand, refused to renegotiate the outstanding $545 million. China’s intransigence, and a lack of information about the bilateral talks between Suriname and Beijing, led the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to put its financial assistance program on hold, the IMF indicated.
Although it has been reported that in late 2024 Suriname reached an agreement with Beijing to restructure its debt, experts warn that the details have not yet been clarified. “Suriname remains the country with the highest per capita debt to China in the region and is one of the few with which Beijing has shown reluctance to restructure liabilities, a stance it has also adopted in several cases in Africa. Although the possibility of renegotiation has been discussed, so far, no agreement has been made official in a transparent manner,” Ellis said, referring to the opacity that characterizes negotiations with China at a global level.
What was confirmed, in December 2024, as reported by Spanish news agency EFE, is that Guyana and Suriname selected the China Road and Bridge Corporation to build a 1.1-kilometer bridge over the Corentyne River, with a $236-million investment.
China’s growing volume of investment in the Caribbean also raises serious concerns about the autonomy of the countries in the region. “Financial dependence could restrict governments’ ability to make sovereign decisions, as has happened in other nations where Beijing has used economic coercion to pressure those who challenge its interests,” Leland Lazarus, associate director of National Security at Florida International University’s Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy, told Diálogo.
Strategic ports in Beijing’s military sights
File photo of motorists traveling along the Linstead to Moneague segment of the North South Highway in Jamaica, September 4, 2014. The highway has left Jamaica with a $730-million debt to China with tolls unaffordable for most Jamaicans. (Photo: Jamaica Information Service)
China’s port expansion in the Caribbean is one of its greatest geostrategic objectives. Although investment in port infrastructure would appear to be in line with planning for a country that transports some 90 percent of its cargo by sea, experts warn that these projects have a dual use, both civilian and military. “China takes advantage of its commercial presence to strengthen its influence in defense matters, using key infrastructures such as ports to consolidate its global position,” said Berg.
One of the main risks lies in the collection of intelligence, including maritime and customs information, geolocation, regulatory records and commercial information, and the monitoring of shipping lanes. “Any Chinese company operating abroad is legally obliged to report its activities to Beijing, which makes these civilian infrastructures strategic points for the Asian country,” Berg explained. According to CSIS, given that almost all global maritime goods pass through China-made infrastructure, China could take advantage of the information to which it has access to divert or delay military equipment, quarantine essential supplies, or seize critical goods such as medicine.
China’s legislation, which allows the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to draw on the nation’s resources and mobilize civilian assets, escalate the concerns. “National security and economic security are intertwined, inseparable and absolutely linked,” Lazarus said. According to Wall Street Journal investigations, in the United Arab Emirates and Equatorial Guinea, China-funded port projects were designed with specifications that would facilitate access for military vessels.
One of the ports under the greatest scrutiny in the Caribbean is the Freeport Container Port (FCP) in the Bahamas — which has very deep waters — known as the “Transshipment Hub of the Americas.” It is currently operated by China’s state-owned company Hutchison Port Holdings. “It is a key point in terms of regional security, so China’s interest in this territory is no coincidence,” Ellis said.
China’s port presence in the Bahamas is not limited to Freeport. Less than 200 miles from Florida is the North Abaco Port, built by state-owned China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC). Added to this is the Airport Gateway Project in Nassau, developed by China Construction America (CCA) and financed by the China Exim Bank.
But there is more. In Jamaica, the Kingston Freeport Terminal represents another enclave of high geopolitical value. Meanwhile, in Antigua, the megaport project led by Yida Zhang is forging ahead, further consolidating Beijing’s presence in this sensitive strategic sector.
Antigua: China’s enclave that is redefining the Caribbean
Antigua, the small Caribbean island of 70,000 inhabitants, is preparing to host one of China’s most ambitious projects in the region: the Special Economic Zone Holdings(SEZH). This megaproject, promoted by Chinese businessman Yida Zhang and under construction by state-owned China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC), will cover some 810 hectares — an area equivalent to 40 percent of the island’s territory — and will function as a special economic zone, granting tax exemptions and legal privileges to Chinese investors. According to a Newsweek investigation, the SEZH will include a port, an airline, its own customs, and the capacity to issue passports and register companies in strategic sectors such as logistics, cryptocurrencies, virology, and cosmetic surgery.
File photo of the Port of Kingston in Jamaica. China’s firm China Merchants Port Holdings is in complete control of Kingston Freeport Terminal Limited, the entity responsible for managing the Port of Kingston, under a 30-year concession agreement. (Photo: Shipping Association of Jamaica)
“This is a clear example of the ‘enclave projects’ that China is consolidating in small and vulnerable economies such as those in the Caribbean,” said Ellis, who warns that China’s model of influence in the region has clear parallels with its strategy in Africa. “Many of these countries achieved independence relatively recently, and their governments have been dominated by political parties born out of the independence movements. This has allowed China to strengthen ties with the region’s political and economic elites, facilitating the creation of megaprojects such as the one in Antigua and, with it, exerting significant influence,” Ellis added.
Ellis points out that, based on per capita indicators, China’s presence is most evident in countries such as Grenada, Dominica, Jamaica, Barbados and Antigua, where small size and limited government capabilities have created an ideal environment for Beijing to consolidate its economic and strategic power.
According to Lazarus, this influence has also been boosted by mechanisms promoted by these same nations to encourage investment. An example of this is the Citizenship by Investment (CBI) program, which has facilitated the arrival of wealthy Chinese citizens in the Caribbean. “As more Chinese citizens move their capital and acquire nationality in these countries, Beijing could use this influential community to further expand its political and economic power in the region,” Lazarus said.
Yida Zhang himself is an example of this dynamic: he obtained his citizenship in Antigua through the CBI and now leads one of the most ambitious projects in the region. However, in addition to geopolitical concerns, the project has not been without controversy, especially due to its environmental impact. According to The Guardian, the development area overlaps with a marine reserve protected since 2005, which is home to endangered species. Its alteration could not only destroy key ecosystems but also increase the island’s vulnerability to natural disasters such as hurricanes.
As if this weren’t enough, Yida Zhang’s company also faces allegations of corruption. Lazarus’ investigations revealed that the company is involved in litigation with local real estate company Luxury Locations, which sued for $3 billion for non-payment.
Growing discontent
China has consolidated its influence in a region where, just two decades ago, its presence was almost non-existent. Although China’s drive seems to have no intention of slowing down, as this presence grows, so does the resistance to the real cost of this relationship. Factors such as local unemployment, the lack of labor, and environmental regulations, as well as Beijing’s reluctance to restructure loans have become sources of friction, tarnishing the relationship between China and the Caribbean and casting a growing shadow over the image of the Asian power in the region.
In the labor area, Caribbean unions have denounced the fact that Chinese companies enjoy unfair advantages, such as customs exemptions and lowered security costs, which affect the competitiveness of the local market, the ICWA emphasized. In Jamaica, for example, protests have taken place due to wage irregularities and the hiring of a disproportionate number of Chinese workers, to the detriment of the local workforce, the Jamaica Observer reported.
The overflowing environmental impact is another growing concern. According to data from the Wilson Center’s Environmental Change and Security Program blog, New Security Beat, several island countries in the region have begun to implement restrictive measures to protect their ecosystems and preserve tourism, one of their most important assets. As an example of this resistance, in 2019, the government of Trinidad and Tobago canceled a $70 million contract with the China Gezhouba Group International Engineering Company and the Housing Development Corporation due to a lack of transparency in environmental impact assessments. Similarly, in Guyana, the government rejected the China Harbor Engineering Company’s request to extend the deadline for the modernization of the international airport, a $150 million project that remains unfinished due to deficiencies in materials and problems related to environmental safety.