By: Paul Sarran
May 9, 2025
If a UNC-led government were to approve Tobago’s autonomy, it could fundamentally shift the political landscape in Trinidad and Tobago particularly by undermining the PNM’s electoral advantage. For decades, the PNM has counted on Tobago as a stronghold, consistently winning both of the island’s parliamentary seats. In close general elections, those seats have often tipped the balance in favour of the PNM. But if Tobago were granted autonomy and ceased participating in national elections, the PNM would be left to compete solely in Trinidad, where its support is more limited and geographically concentrated.
Tobago’s call for autonomy is not a recent development. Since the 1970s, Tobagonians have pushed for greater control over their own affairs, fuelled by frustrations over centralised governance and perceived neglect. While various governments have flirted with reform, few have followed through with concrete, lasting changes. The PNM, despite dominating Tobago politics for years, has often slowed the autonomy conversation likely because it has benefited electorally from maintaining the status quo.
The UNC, by contrast, has never had a real electoral presence in Tobago. It stands to lose nothing by supporting the island’s push for self-governance. In fact, such a move could be framed as a principled stand demonstrating respect for regional self-determination. But there’s no denying the political calculus: if Tobago exits the national electoral stage, the UNC gains a strategic advantage. The PNM would be stripped of two near-guaranteed seats, which could tip future elections in the UNC’s favour.
The impact on the PNM would be significant. Without Tobago’s support, the party would be forced to expand its influence into central and southern Trinidad areas where it has historically underperformed. Doing so would require a transformation in messaging, policy, and ground-level organisation. It’s not just a matter of picking up votes; the party would need to reimagine itself as a broader, more inclusive national movement. That would be a tall order after years of consolidating power in specific regions.
The loss of Tobago would also hurt the PNM symbolically. The party has long promoted itself as a truly national institution, representing both islands. Without Tobago’s involvement, that image would be harder to sustain. It risks becoming perceived as a Trinidad-based party with limited cross-island reach. That perception could weaken its appeal among undecided voters and even among some in its traditional base.
Internally, the consequences could be even more severe. The Tobago Council of the PNM has often operated with a degree of independence from the party’s central leadership, and tensions between the two have surfaced periodically. If autonomy becomes reality, those tensions could widen into a full political rupture. The PNM’s relevance in Tobago may diminish altogether, especially if it is blamed for delaying the autonomy process while in office.
For the UNC, the potential rewards are twofold. Domestically, it could be seen as the party that finally delivered on Tobago’s long-standing demand for self-governance. Internationally, it could gain credibility as a progressive administration willing to decentralise power. It would be a powerful narrative: a government acting in the national interest rather than partisan self-preservation.
Still, the move wouldn’t come without political risks. Critics would likely question the timing and motives behind the decision, accusing the UNC of using autonomy as a tool to weaken its main rival. Others might worry about the precedent it sets raising questions about national unity and whether other regions might demand similar treatment. The UNC would have to manage the optics carefully, ensuring the transition appears legitimate and not purely opportunistic.
Moreover, autonomy would come with practical challenges. Tobago would have to take on new responsibilities in governance, finance, and institutional management. The shift away from dependence on the central government would require strong leadership and careful planning to avoid economic instability or administrative breakdown. If the transition falters, the backlash could affect not only Tobago politicians but also the national government that oversaw the change.
In Trinidad, the removal of Tobago from the national electoral equation would force all political parties to recalibrate. The PNM could no longer rely on Tobago to make up for narrow losses in marginal constituencies like St. Joseph or Barataria/San Juan. That alone could cost it future elections unless it makes gains in UNC-dominated areas. At the same time, smaller parties might see an opening. With the traditional UNC–PNM duopoly disrupted; coalition politics could become more viable.
Granting Tobago autonomy would mark a historic shift not only for the island but for the nation as a whole. It would challenge long-held political assumptions, trigger a rebalancing of power, and potentially usher in a new era of electoral competition. The PNM would face an existential question: can it remain competitive without Tobago? The UNC would be tested on whether it can manage the transition with integrity and competence.
Whatever the political fallout, one thing is clear: Tobago’s autonomy would not be a mere administrative change. It would reshape how governance, representation, and political power function in Trinidad and Tobago. For both major parties, it would signal the end of politics as usual and the beginning of something entirely new.
(The author Paul Sarran is a Political Science Student at The University of the West Indies Global Campus in St Augustine.)
Email your opinions, letters and commentaries to: letters@caribmagplus.com