INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

IMF Country Report No. 23/230

HAITI

June 2023

SECOND REVIEW UNDER THE STAFF-MONITORED PROGRAM—PRESS RELEASE; AND STAFF REPORT

In the context of the First Review Under the Staff-Monitored Program (SMP), the following documents have been released and are included in the package:

- A **Press Release**
- The **Staff Report** prepared by a staff team of the IMF for the Executive Board's information following discussions that ended on April 28, 2023, with the officials of Haiti on economic developments and policies underpinning the First Review Under the Staff-Monitored Program. Based on information available at the time of these discussions, the staff report was completed on May 31, 2023.

The IMF's transparency policy allows for the deletion of market-sensitive information and premature disclosure of the authorities' policy intentions in published staff reports and other documents.

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PRESS RELEASE

PR23/213

IMF Management Completes the Second Review of the Staff Monitored-Program with Haiti

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Staff Monitored Programs (SMPs) are informal arrangements between national authorities and IMF staff to monitor the authorities' economic program. As such, they do not entail endorsement by the IMF Executive Board. SMP Staff reports are issued to the Board for information

- *Management of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved on May 30, 2023 the second and final review of Haiti's Staff-Monitored Program (SMP). The SMP has helped the government restore macroeconomic stability and strengthen governance and fiscal transparency.*
- *The SMP has played an important role in advancing decisive governance reforms to enhance accountability through stronger public finance management, revenue administration, data provision, and anti-corruption measures.*
- *The program has been designed to take into account Haiti's fragility and capacity constraints and has helped the authorities build a track record of policy implementation.*

Washington, DC – June 15, 2023: Management of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved on May 30, 2023 the Second and Final review of the Staff-Monitored Program (SMP) which started in June 2022. The SMP was designed to support the authorities' economic policy objectives and build a track record of reform implementation. In line with the Fund's Strategy for Fragile and Conflict-Affected States, staff also coordinated closely with Haiti's main development partners.

Haiti faces a challenging macroeconomic outlook amid a humanitarian crisis. The country has been hit hard by economic spillovers from Russia's invasion of Ukraine, with food price inflation triggering a hunger crisis. This global shock has been compounded by a dire security situation, which has heightened the economy's fragility, hampered activity, and generated supply-side bottlenecks which have further fueled inflation. External shocks and the volatility of the security situation have resulted in a macroeconomic environment that has been worse than had been envisaged at the time of the program's approval by IMF management in June 2022.

Despite the more challenging domestic and external environment, the authorities have adopted important policy reforms, anchored by the SMP, and displayed a firm commitment throughout. The reforms cover governance and anti-corruption, tax and revenue administration, public finance management (including budget preparation and execution), central bank autonomy and governance, and anti-money laundering. Data provision has also improved during the course of the program. All these reforms have enhanced transparency in public spending and in the financial sector and helped maintain macroeconomic stability. Despite the delicate political situation, thanks to a highly inclusive consultative process, the authorities have taken the necessary ownership and earned public support for the SMP through the high-level Program Monitoring Committee.

The Haitian authorities had adopted a budget for FY2023 that is consistent with agreed targets under the SMP and in the context of a medium-term fiscal framework. Implementation of the budget has been to date consistent with the objective of the SMP of reducing monetary financing of the budget deficit to levels that staff assesses to be non-inflationary. The authorities are striving to ensure that a meaningful budget allocation is used to protect the most vulnerable and are implementing public financial management systems to monitor the use of public funds.

In line with the reforms under the SMP, the authorities also took measures aimed at strengthening revenue administration and boosting revenue mobilization over time. These include the approval of a new tax code and tax procedures code, publication of all codes and tariffs related to customs, adoption of unique Tax Identification Numbers (TINs), publication of the TIN database and of the file of active taxpayers, and stronger oversight of the revenue agency since August 2022. Notably, the new tax code—a primer in the country's history—entails the rationalization and simplification of the personal income tax and corporate income tax, including through the broadening of the tax base and elimination of many exemptions. Thanks mainly to an improvement of revenue administration, customs revenue has reached a historic high in recent months, although from a low base.

There has been significant progress on governance issues, and corruption and broader financial integrity risks need to continue to be effectively addressed. The authorities have taken measures to strengthen accountability in the use of public resources and have boosted the transparency of public procurement for emergency resources. The recent finalization of revisions to the Central Bank and to the AML/CFT legal frameworks are also critical for improving governance and transparency. They have also recently made a formal request for a Fund *Governance Diagnostic*, which is a very welcome development.

The Haitian authorities have expressed interest in another SMP, which should help maintain macroeconomic stability and lock in and sustain recent approved reforms to further enhance economic resilience and governance.

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

HAITI

SECOND REVIEW UNDER THE STAFF-MONITORED PROGRAM

May 31, 2023

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Context. Haiti faces a challenging macroeconomic outlook amid a humanitarian crisis. The country has been hit hard by economic spillovers from Russia's invasion of Ukraine, with food price inflation triggering a hunger crisis. This global shock has been compounded by a dire security situation, which has heightened the economy's fragility, hampered activity, and generated supply-side bottlenecks which have further fueled inflation. Risks to the outlook are tilted to the downside.

Program implementation. The implementation under the SMP has been broadly satisfactory. Despite domestic and global difficulties, the authorities have adopted important policy reforms, anchored by the SMP, and displayed a firm commitment throughout. The reforms cover governance and anti-corruption, tax and revenue administration, public finance management, including budget preparation and execution, and central bank independence. Data has also improved. All these have enhanced much-needed transparency in public spending and in the financial sector and helped maintain macroeconomic stability. Despite the delicate political landscape, and thanks to a highly inclusive consultative process, the authorities have taken the necessary ownership and earned public support for the SMP through the high-level Program Monitoring Committee (*Comité de Suivi)*. The authorities met three of the four end-December 2022 periodic quantitative targets (QTs) and the indicative targets (IT) for end-December. They missed the end-December QT floor on budget allocation to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (MAST) for social expenditure. The authorities also met four of the five ITs for end-March 2023 and missed by a narrow margin the IT floor on central government revenues, which was revised up at the time of the first review. The authorities also met the three continuous QTs—non-accumulation of both domestic and external arrears and no new contracting or guaranteeing by the public sector of non-concessional external debt. Despite some delays, all structural benchmarks were achieved. The two end-March 2023 structural benchmarks were not met but implemented with delay in April. The end-April 2023 structural benchmark and the monthly and quarterly structural benchmarks were all met.

Next steps. The authorities have expressed interest in another SMP, which should help lock in and sustain recent approved reforms to further enhance economic resilience and governance. The new SMP will continue to be supported by Fund capacity development assistance. In line with the Fund Strategy for Fragile and Conflict-Affected States, staff will also continue to coordinate closely with Haiti's main development partners.

Approved By
Patricia Alonso-Gamo and Peter Dohlman

Discussions took place remotely during April 4-6 and in person in Washington during the week of the spring meetings (April 10-17), continued remotely thereafter, and were concluded on April 28. The team comprised Ms. Tumbarello (Head), Mr. Noah Ndela, Ms. Bhattacharya (all WHD), Ms. Osorio-Buitron (FAD) and Mr. Shenai (SPR) and Messrs. Duvalsaint and Wata (Port-au-Prince office). Ms. Ojo (WHD) provided valuable research assistance and Ms. Coquillat (WHD) assisted with logistics and document preparations. Mr. Saraiva and Ms. Florestal (OED) joined the discussions. The team met with Mr. Michel Patrick Boisvert (Minister of Economy and Finance), Mr. Jean Baden Dubois (Governor of the Bank of the Republic of Haiti), Mr. Pierre Ricot Odney (Minister of Social Affairs and Labor), other senior officials, the private sector (civil society, association of industries, and banking association), and the international community through the process (WB, IADB, EU, UN, USAID, and WFP) to coordinate technical assistance and donor support.

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TABLES

APPENDIX

CONTEXT AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

1. **Haiti continues to face dire humanitarian and security crises**. The country has been hit hard by the economic spillovers from Russia's invasion of Ukraine, with food price inflation triggering a hunger crisis affecting over 50 percent of the population. To address Haiti's balance of payments needs, the Fund approved in January 2023 US$110.6 million under the Food Shock Window (FSW) of the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF). The security situation remains very difficult, with gangs controlling large parts of the capital and key infrastructure, worsening widespread fuel shortages. The recent cholera outbreak has further aggravated the emergency.

2. **Political uncertainty persists, albeit with one notable achievement**. Prime Minister Henry signed on December 21, 2022, a new agreement with representatives of all political parties, the private sector, and NGOs. The agreement, "National Consensus for an Inclusive Transition and Transparent Elections," includes a timetable for installing an elected government by February 2024; the establishment of a *High Council for the Transition* (set up in February), and soon of a *Body for the control of government action* to enhance the current government's accountability (including through the oversight of the budget process); and measures to fight corruption.

3. **Macroeconomic conditions remain challenging**. In fiscal year 2022 (FY2022)[1], real GDP contracted for the fourth consecutive year, by 1.7 percent (Table 1). Year-on-year inflation reached 48.3 percent in March 2023 as food prices surged 48 percent (year-on-year), driven by global commodity and supply-side disruptions (security and drought). Month-on-month inflation, however, has declined sharply, from near 11 percent in October to 1.7 percent in March, suggesting that inflation is decelerating. The deficit of the non-financial public sector (NFPS) narrowed by 0.4 of a percentage point to 2.1 percent of GDP in FY2022 (Table 2a and Table 2b). Still, this was 0.6 percentage point above the level expected when the SMP was approved in June 2022 and was attributable mainly to higher-than-expected fuel subsidies (until mid-September 2022). The current account balance shifted to a deficit of 2.3 percent of GDP (Table 3a and Table 3b), from a surplus of ½ percent in FY2021, owing mostly to a negative terms-of-trade shock (higher fuel and food import costs). The exchange rate (gourde vis-à-vis US dollar) continued to depreciate, reaching 154 at the end of March 2023, a 30½ percent depreciation from September 30, 2022. Fuel shortages and security issues continue to undermine economic activity, with credit growth decelerating to 2.5 percent (year-on-year) in the first quarter of 2023.

Inflation
(Percent)



Sources: Haitian Institute of Statistics and Informatics (IHSI), and Bank of the Republic of Haiti.

[1] The fiscal year runs from October 1 to September 30.

4. Signs of resilience have emerged, and buffers have been rebuilt, although from a low base, suggesting that policies, aligned with Staff-Monitored Program (SMP), have helped the economy. Net international reserves (NIR) have picked up in recent months, reaching almost US$396 million in mid-April 2023 (US$110.6 million related to the FSW disbursement), up from just US$114 million at end-October 2022. This increase reflects recent FX purchases to rebuild external buffers, as well as valuation effects in the central bank's FX portfolio. Remittances remained resilient in 2022 after surging in 2020-21 and were still higher than in the pre-Covid period (as a share of imports). Custom duties helped boost fiscal revenue by 50 percent in the first six months of FY2023, which also reflected improved revenue administration and the government's ability to collect taxes on fuel imports at the new regulated price. Monetary financing of the budget decreased considerably during October 2022-March 2023 (year-on-year)—in line with the SMP objectives—from an annual rate of 2½ percent of GDP to 1 percent.

Reserves Accumulation and Bilateral Exchange Rate



Sources: Bank of the Republic of Haiti and IMF staff estimates.

Remittances, 2018-22



Sources: Bank of the Republic of Haiti, national authorities, and IMF staff calculations.

Monetary Financing of the Budget

(In percent of GDP)



Sources: Ministry of Finance (Tableau des Operations Financières de l'Etat—TOFE) and IMF staff estimates.
1/ October 2022-March 2023 data (first semester of FY2023), annualized.

5. Despite multiple challenges, the authorities demonstrated a firm commitment under the SMP which provided a credible anchor for enhancing policymaking and have stayed actively engaged with Fund staff, which has spurred additional support. Since the disbursement of US$110.6 million under the FSW of the Rapid Credit Facility, the authorities' engagement has strengthened through the high-level Program Monitoring Committee (*Comité de Suivi)*—which meets with IMF staff biweekly. Since the last review, the Fund has also continued actively supporting Haiti's capacity development. The IMF Legal Department (LEG) conducted a CD mission on AML/CFT in late January and advised the authorities on the revision of the Central Bank law; the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) and LEG delivered assistance on the consumer-pricing mechanism reform of the fuel subsidy regime, completed in April. The latter will allow changes in international fuel prices to be regularly passed on to consumers.[2] This reform also features a smoothing mechanism to protect consumers by limiting the monthly variation of prices at the pump (through revisions of the current 1995 law).[3] FAD and the Caribbean Regional Technical Assistance Centre (CARTAC) provided technical assistance (TA) on cash management to improve PFM systems; FAD also delivered TA on revenue administration to broaden the tax base and improve tax compliance; the IMF Statistics Department worked with the authorities to support the production of quarterly GDP data; and the Monetary and Capital Markets Department (MCM) delivered TA on the Central Bank Banking Chart of Accounts to align them with IFRS Standards. Finally, the SMP has helped facilitate the forthcoming budget support (€19.5 million) from the European Union, which was conditional, among other things, on the successful completion of the first and second reviews of the SMP.

PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION UNDER THE SMP

6. The overall SMP implementation has been broadly satisfactory. It has helped the authorities stabilize the macroeconomic situation and move ahead with key structural reforms. This despite a worsening global economic environment, elevated global food and fuel prices, a cholera epidemic, and a highly volatile security situation.

- **Quantitative and indicative targets** (Appendix 1. Table 1). The authorities met three of the four end-December 2022 periodic quantitative targets (QTs)—the floor on the NIR of the central bank; the floor on the preliminary balance of the NFPS; and the ceiling on the net central bank credit to the NFPS— the indicative targets (IT) for end-December. But they missed the QT on budget allocation to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (MAST). However, missing this target does not imply underperformance in targeted social spending, but rather the implementation of additional safeguards that somewhat slowed budget execution by MAST (which included a more detailed tracking system). They also met four of the five ITs for March 2023, including the budget allocation to MAST. They missed by a narrow margin, however, the floor on central government revenues, which was revised up at the time of the first review. The authorities also met the three continuous QTs—non-accumulation of both domestic and external arrears and no new contracting or guaranteeing by the public sector of non-concessional external debt.

- **Structural benchmarks supported by capacity development** (Appendix 1. Table 2). Despite some delays, all structural benchmarks were achieved. The two end-March 2023 structural benchmarks were not met but implemented with delay in April. The end-April 2023 structural benchmark and the monthly and quarterly structural benchmarks were all met. In spite of the multiple challenges, the authorities have continued implementing the structural reform agenda, supported by Fund CD, in the following areas:

[2] The one-time increases in fuel prices were announced in September 2022 and passed on to consumers at the pump in November 2022 (First Review of the SMP, footnote 1, and ¶9).

[3] The next steps entail ensuring consistency between the amendment law and the excise chapter of the new tax code.

- *Governance and Public Financial Management*. Transparency of operations at the agency Economic and Social Assistance Fund FAES has improved. The authorities re-convened the governing board of FAES and prepared the quarterly report on its operations through March 2023 (quarterly structural benchmark). They also continue to publish, on a regular basis, all public procurement contracts, including information on the successful bidders (monthly structural benchmark). They have also expanded the Treasury Single account (TSA) and adopted a medium-term budget framework with the NFPS deficit as the main anchor.

- *Tax administration*. The authorities issued a decree in late December making compulsory the use of the Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) for all finance departments, with sanctions for fraudulent or non-use. This was followed by publication at the end of April 2023 of the TIN database and the file of active taxpayers (end-March 2023 structural benchmark).

- *Central bank law*. The authorities have completed the benchmark on finalizing amendments to the central bank Law, which were ratified by the Board of Directors of the BRH at the end of April 2023 in line with Fund's TA (end-March 2023 structural benchmark). Achieving this benchmark also marks a key milestone in implementing the recommendations of the 2019 Safeguards Assessment.

- *Anti-money laundering*. The authorities have drafted a new AML/CFT Decree that is in greater alignment with Financial Action Task Force (FATF) international standards than the previous AML/CFT law and that was endorsed by the Council of Ministers (end-April structural benchmark).

- *Tax Policy and Custom Administration*. The government has adopted of a new tax code, a primer that simplifies the tax system and eliminates many exemptions, and it is publishing all codes and tariffs related to customs.

- *Safeguards*. The FY2021 financial audit of the BRH has been completed and its audited financial statements published.

OUTLOOK AND RISKS

7. **The macroeconomic outlook for Haiti remains very challenging**. Growth is expected to be almost muted at 0.1 percent in FY2023 (slightly lower than 0.3 percent projected at the time of the First Review), in line with the deceleration in credit growth, owing mainly to the security crisis. It is expected to reach 1½ percent over the medium term, depending on continued implementation of structural reforms and an improved security situation. Inflation is expected to moderate gradually–to about 30 percent at the end of this fiscal year–as the impact of lower monetary financing of the fiscal deficit takes effect and world market prices for food and fuel stabilize. Inflation is then forecast to ease further over the medium term, assuming adequate macroeconomic policies. The fiscal deficit of the NFPS is projected at 1.8 percent of GDP in FY2023—0.3 percentage points below that envisaged at the time of the SMP approval—because of lower fuel subsidies and higher customs

revenues. The fiscal deficit would expand slightly to about 2.2-2½ percent of GDP over the medium term, led primarily by capital spending. External debt indicators are expected to declined relative to the First Review as fiscal deficits are lower than envisaged at the time of the First Review, resulting also in a lower monetary financing of the deficit. The current account deficit is expected to narrow to 0.8 percent of GDP in FY2023, and further to 0.6 percent over the medium term, assuming imports compression and as import prices stabilize.

8. The outlook is subject to multiple risks, including security, and it is tilted mainly to the downside. Domestic risks include intensified political instability, gang-related disruptions to economic activity, a further spread of cholera, a worsening of the hunger crisis, and extreme natural disasters. Externally, Haiti is vulnerable to volatile remittance flows, lower-than-expected external financing, and renewed surges in global food and energy prices. Normalization of the security situation (not envisaged in our baseline) would greatly improve the medium-term outlook. The projected path of public debt is sustainable, although consistent with a high risk of debt distress and the debt-carrying capacity is assessed as medium, as ascertained in the most recent DSA (see EBS/23/4).

POLICY DISCUSSIONS

A. Fiscal Policy

9. Background. During the first half of FY2023, domestic revenue was much stronger than in previous years, rising by 48 percent, owing mainly to custom duties and reflecting strong improvement in revenue administration and the government's ability to collect taxes on fuel imports at the new regulated price. Domestic revenue had a weak start, as a result of the paralysis of the economy in September/October, attributable to the temporary loss of access to the main fuel terminal (*Varreux*), which reduced tax collection in October 2022. In nominal term, revenue recovered to its historical high as activity resumed. Average monthly revenue exceeded 17 billion gourdes in the second quarter of FY2023, relative to a monthly average of 11 billion gourdes during the year-earlier quarter. Nominal spending grew 18 percent (year-on-year) in the first semester of FY2023, led mainly by capital spending (25 percent), including to strengthen national police. The increase in current spending was more subdued (13 percent), with energy transfers (including fuel and

Haiti: Execution of Social Spending

Ministry	FY2022 1/		Oct-Dec 2022		Jan-Mar 2023		Oct 2022-Mar 2023	
	In millions of gourdes	In percent of GDP	In millions of gourdes	In percent of GDP	In millions of gourdes	In percent of GDP	In millions of gourdes	In percent of GDP
Agriculture	1,953	0.09	344	0.01	396	0.01	740	0.02
Education	20,767	0.96	6,026	0.19	4,430	0.14	10,456	0.33
Public health	6,433	0.30	1,879	0.06	1,078	0.03	2,957	0.09
Social affairs and labor 2/	3,964	0.18	391	0.01	5,811	0.19	6,202	0.20
Total	33,117	1.53	8,639	0.28	11,715	0.38	20,354	0.65

Sources: Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) and IMF staff calculations.
1/ Fiscal year 2022 ends in September 2022.
2/ MAST.

electricity) cut in half,[4] as the fuel price adjustment has cut fuel subsidies to zero. During the first semester of FY2023, social spending totaled 0.65 percent of GDP, slightly higher than the year-earlier period (0.62 percent of GDP). In nominal terms, total social spending surged 50 percent year-on-year, reaching 20.3 billion gourdes. The higher level of spending is primarily domestically financed. Monetary financing of the budget stood at 1 percent of GDP, based on annualized data using the outturn for the first semester.

10. Spending related to the FSW. Resources related to the FSW had not been spent as of April 30, 2023 and were kept as reserves at the central bank. This reflected the authorities' commitment to following proper procurement processes as well as the need to respect the safeguards agreed under the RCF. Staff has given the authorities a template to facilitate the reporting of forthcoming spending under the FSW, in line with FAD-suggested best practice, to enhance transparency and accountability in the use of public spending.

11. Implementation of the 2023 budget is consistent with the SMP goals of reducing monetary financing of the deficit and in-line with staff's earlier projections. The overall government balance is projected at 1.9 percent of GDP in FY2023 (2 percent at the time of the First Review). Monetary financing is expected to reach 1.4 percent of GDP at the end of the fiscal year, given seasonality in spending, far below the 2.3 percent in FY2022. Total domestic tax revenue is expected to climb to 6.4 percent in 2023, from 5.3 percent of GDP in 2022, broadly in line with the first Review. The higher tax revenue owes to higher customs revenue, given the recent revenue administration reforms, and the fuel price adjustment—projected to yield 0.9 percent of GDP from taxes on fuel imports. As for expenditures, current spending and domestically financed capital spending are projected to rise by 1.2 percentage point of GDP relative to 2022.[5] With global oil prices moderating, fuel subsidies will remain at zero for the rest of the fiscal year, and transfers to the electricity company will total 0.4 percent of GDP, consistent with historical patterns. The medium-term fiscal deficit is projected to slightly widen to an average of 2.1 percent of GDP, driven by a slight increase in capital spending to support infrastructure needs.

12. Efforts to boost revenue have been successful and collection should be sustained. Weaker-than-expected revenue collection at the start of the SMP at end-June 2022 prompted the implementation of administrative measures in August. These included strengthening the control of invoices submitted for imported goods and replacing the management of the revenue agency. These measures helped the authorities meet the indicative target on the floor of central government fiscal revenue for December. Staff welcomed this development and encouraged the authorities to sustain efforts to strengthen revenue mobilization—to help anchor monetary financing and finance large social and infrastructure needs and work toward the implementation of the tax code of customs reforms (approved by the Council of Ministries in December 2022 as part of the SMP's structural agenda) and of tax administration. To this end, the authorities have requested TA from the

[4] Budget presentation and reporting improved substantially for FY2023 and clearly indicate electricity subsidies.
[5] Foreign financed capital spending is fully financed by grant revenues.

Fund to help implement the tax code, which will become operational in October 2024 as well as TA on custom administration.[6]

13. Meaningful progress has been achieved on PFM, with respect to enhancing the transparency of public spending and public finance reporting and accountability, and efforts should continue. Since March 2023, the authorities have provided far more detailed monthly data on budget execution (including spending on wages, goods and services, and capital investment by ministry and by project) and published (on the web site of the *Direction General du Budget*, MEF) detailed budget execution by line ministries. They are also committed to sharing more detailed quarterly financial statements for the FAES, following PFM best practices provided by the FAD. The authorities have made progress in seeking to consolidate the Treasury Single Account (TSA) (structural benchmark). They have also prepared a medium-term budget framework (MTBF), with the NFPS deficit as the main anchor, adopted together with the FY2023 budget. Going forward, the MTBF should be prepared using a top-down approach to set expenditure ceilings that will guide budget preparation at the line ministry level. Building on this reform, each key line ministry should prepare a medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF), using its defined expenditure ceilings. This reform would help ensure that the budget of line ministries conforms with the one reported by the ministry of finance, thus fostering also accountability of line ministries and consistency between data on budget execution and the budget document.

Contribution of Energy Subsidies to the Fiscal Balance
(Percent of GDP)



Sources: World economic outlook (WEO) and IMF staff projections.
Figures for 2023 correspond to projections.

14. The authorities are working towards strengthening the social safety net and efforts should continue. Fuel subsidy reform is essential to ensure medium-term fiscal sustainability. Given the political and social implications, the authorities are taking the lead both in terms of the modalities and timing of the reform. The authorities started reviewing the retail price-setting mechanism, as the September fuel price increases have eliminated fuel subsidies only temporarily, and a comprehensive and transparent policy framework for future price adjustments needs to be implemented. The forthcoming fuel price reforms should include mitigating measures to protect the most vulnerable in conjunction with a gradual and well-communicated approach. Staff and the authorities agreed that an elaborated communication policy would greatly help the authorities' reform strategy. Establishing a regulatory framework for the petroleum products sector and strengthening related regulatory institutions should remain amongst the authorities' reform priorities. The authorities are taking steps to cushion the impact of the shocks on the population.

[6] The authorities are also receiving support from the World Bank on customs, which entails a stock-taking exercise of customs procedures and practices, working with customs administration and sector stakeholders, under the Advisory Services and Analytics umbrella activities. Staff is closely coordinating to ensure synergies between the two institutions.

The authorities have prepared a detailed strategy to tackle food insecurity and strengthen the social safety (see text Table1 and ¶15 of IMF Country Report No. 23/48 and ¶8 of IMF Country Report No. 23/80), also leveraging ongoing programs. The plan aims to expand programs that improve living conditions and enhance social inclusion, focusing on the most vulnerable groups (children, women, and old-age group).

B. Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy

15. Background. Monetary financing of the budget has decreased since the start of the SMP (text chart in ¶4), which enhances the credibility of the monetary policy framework. On the exchange rate front, recent data suggest that the authorities' interventions in the foreign exchange (FX) market are mainly to rebuild NIR. The authorities also began to unwind some FX surrender requirements (per Circular 114.3), a positive step in line with staff recommendations. And they have requested technical assistance on FX market operations, aiming at eliminating the foreign exchange parallel market.[7]

16. To strengthen the monetary and exchange rate frameworks, staff continued to recommend:

- (i) greater exchange rate flexibility,
- (ii) a ceiling on credit to the NFPS as the main anchor to limit monetary financing of the deficit to 1½ percent of GDP, and
- (iii) short-term liquidity-absorbing operations at a fixed rate (policy rate) and full allotment.

Staff recommended a further increase in short-term interest rates to initiate disinflation, given the large negative real rate of about 15 percent. While the interest rate transmission to inflation is weak, there is little room to tighten direct instruments further as reserve requirements are already at 50 percent.

17. The BRH should continue to limit its interventions in the FX market to smoothing excessive exchange rate volatility. Staff recommended that the BRH:

- (i) put in place an appropriate mechanism for FX interventions, such as well-designed weekly FX auctions, in lieu of the FX allocation system;
- (ii) advance its ongoing work on an FX market intervention rule; and
- (iii) complete the revision of banks' net open position (NOP) limits.

[7] The BRH published the daily reference exchange rate (taux de référence), a weighted average between the interbank rate or *marche bancaire* (60 percent), and the informal rate or *marche informel* (40 percent). In addition to the informal rate reported by the BRH, a *parallel* market rate is obtained from informal surveys data.

These reforms will deepen the foreign exchange market and help the government formalize the FX market as well. Staff also urged the authorities to maintain their commitments not to introduce exchange restrictions or multiple currency practices. Staff received requested information on the unwinding of FX surrender requirement measures (under Circular 114.3).

Exchange Rate and Foreign Exchange Intervention



Sources: Bank of the Republic of Haiti and IMF staff estimates.

Net Foreign Assets and Net International Reserves of the Central Bank
(Millions of US dollars)



Sources: Bank of the Republic of Haiti and Fund staff estimates.
1/ For 2023, NFA refers to February 2023 and NIR refers to mid-April 2023 data.

C. Financial Sector

18. Background. The BRH is advancing reforms to increase financial inclusion and support growth. It has been strengthening banking supervision, with Fund assistance, to upgrade the regulatory framework and move to risk-based supervision. More information is needed for a full-fledged assessment of risks faced by the financial sector, including for small non-bank financial institutions that have been growing fast.

19. Reform efforts will need focus on:

- **Banking supervision**. The BRH has reinforced human capital through external hiring and training of supervisors. It finalized the pre-draft of risk assessment grids and the rating matrix for financial institutions, an important step toward risk-based supervision. The adoption of regulations on risk concentration, classification, and provisioning of credits—and a new chart of accounts for financial institutions—are being finalized. Staff commends recent progress and urges the BRH to finalize pending regulation and to continue working to establish risk-based supervision, supported by TA.

- **Digital money**. BRH has benefited from the Fund's technical assistance in analyzing key issues related to a central bank digital currency. The BRH conveyed that it does not intend to implement the CBDC at the moment, but stressed the importance of putting a placeholder in the central bank framework, in anticipation of future implementation, as legal frameworks are not frequently revised in Haiti. Staff strongly recommended that the BRH considers all aspects of the project's desirability and feasibility, including a robust evaluation of costs and risks, before proceeding. Haiti still needs to improve the regulatory framework and/or update the national payment system to facilitate mobile payments and operators. Modernization efforts should include migration toward new international messaging standards that support interoperability and financial integrity.

- **Anti-money laundering**. The authorities have upgraded the AML/CFT framework with the technical support of the IMF Legal Department to ensure greater alignment with the international standards of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF); and they approved in April the new AML/CFT Decree. The revised AML/CFT framework should allow Haiti to address a key item on the FATF action plan. The authorities are working with staff to address other steps necessary to exit FATF grey list and ease potential pressures on correspondent banking relationships, including completing sectoral risk assessments, implementing a risk-based supervision regime for financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions, and ensuring transparency of basic and beneficial ownership information on legal persons. The authorities should also review regulations recently published by the BRH to ensure consistency with the new AML/CFT decree. In addition, the authorities are making progress in amending the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) law (Unité Centrale de Renseignements Financiers—UCREF),[8] including to ensure UCREF's operational autonomy. LEG has also provided TA in this area. The IMF Legal Department stands ready to support the authorities on this endeavor.

20. The authorities are committed to the prudent use of Haiti's SDR holdings and to transparent reporting on Haiti's use of its SDR allocation. Haiti converted about half the SDR holdings it received from the 2021 SDR allocation to freely usable currencies, which it subsequently used to pay for priority fiscal spending. Staff emphasized the importance of maintaining institutional frameworks governing the fiscal use of the SDR allocation—including on the repayment terms between the finance ministry and central bank—and on transparency measures for SDR-related spending. The authorities also agreed to communicate publicly on the BRH or MEF websites any future conversion of their SDR allocation into freely usable currencies and to engage staff on future SDR conversions.

D. Governance

21. The authorities have made solid progress on governance and further efforts are needed. The authorities have published public procurement contracts, including the publication of tenders, contracts, and the beneficial owners of successful bidders (monthly SB). To monitor the implementation of social programs, the authorities are committed to follow good PFM practices, in line with recent technical assistance from the IMF. They introduced all social expenditure into the budget and all associated financing in the Single Treasury Account at the central bank, in compliance with procurement, execution, and expenditure control procedures. The authorities have requested an IMF *Governance Diagnostic* CD which should help them identify the next priorities for

[8] The financial intelligence units globally are tasked with receiving suspicious transaction reports from both financial institutions and non-financial institutions in cases where these institutions suspect they are dealing with proceeds of crimes. The FIU analyzes the information and together with other data sources produces intelligence reports that are sent to law enforcement to launch investigations. They are effectively the bridge between the financial sector and the law enforcement community.

governance and anti-corruption reforms. The revision of to the AML/CFT legal framework is also an important step forward to address the FATF recommendations and fight corruption.

22. The authorities committed in January 2023 to strengthen transparency and audit capacity in the spending of emergency resources for the most vulnerable households to ensure accountability. To this end, they have activated budgetary mechanisms to carefully monitor, record, and publish all expenditure related to the emergency response and started publishing comprehensive monthly reports on the execution of the budget (on the *Direction General du Budget*, MEF), no later than 45 days after the end of each month, while carrying out internal audits of expenditure by all the ministries concerned with the requested use of the emergency resources provided in the framework of the IMF Food Shock Window. Staff welcomed these measures and stressed that an accurate and transparent recording of how these resources are spent is important for catalyzing further donor support. Staff will work closely with the authorities to monitor the implementation of these safeguards.

23. With a view to strengthen its governance and operations, the BRH had made further efforts to implement some of the overdue 2019 safeguards recommendations and staff urges the authorities to implement the pending ones. The BRH recently approved drafting amendments to its organic act (end-March 2023 structural benchmark) which, once passed, will strengthen its governance arrangements and autonomy as well as clarify its mandate. The other priority recommendations, such as the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards and development of a medium-term plan to phase-out BRH's involvement in development activities, as well as the alignment of the foreign investment strategy with best practices, remain in progress. Staff will continue to monitor the implementation of these recommendations.

STAFF APPRAISAL

24. Haiti faces humanitarian and security crises, with a challenging macroeconomic outlook and risks tilted to the downside. The country has been hit hard by the economic spillovers from Russia's invasion of Ukraine, with food price inflation triggering a hunger crisis. This global shock has been compounded by political instability and a dire security situation, which has heightened the economy's fragility and further fueled inflation. Risks to the outlook include intensified political instability, a worsening of the security conditions constraining further business activity, further spread of cholera, and natural disasters.

25. Despite domestic and global difficulties, the authorities have adopted important policy reforms over the last year, anchored by the SMP, and displayed a firm commitment throughout. These include reforms on governance and anti-corruption, tax and revenue administration, budget preparation and execution, and central bank independence. Data and statistics have also greatly improved. All these have enhanced much-needed transparency in public spending and in the financial sector and helped maintain macroeconomic stability. Still, the paralysis of economic activity in September/October, owing to the escalation of gang violence, has led to temporary macro slippages. Despite the delicate political landscape, and thanks to a highly inclusive consultative process, the authorities built the necessary ownership and public support for the SMP (including through public consultations when warranted) through the high-level Program Monitoring Committee (*Comité de Suivi)*.

26. The recent fiscal reforms are encouraging and should continue to allow Haiti to finance its large development needs. The authorities have taken crucial measures to strengthen revenue administration and boost revenue mobilization over time. These include the approval of a new tax code and tax procedures code, publication of all codes and tariffs related to customs, adoption of unique Tax Identification Numbers (TINs), publication of the TIN database and of the file of active taxpayers, and stronger oversight of the revenue agency since August 2022. Thanks mainly to an improvement of revenue administration, customs revenue has reached a historic high in recent months, although from a low base.

27. Staff welcomes the recent progress made in reducing governance vulnerabilities, but corruption and broader financial integrity risks need to continue to be effectively addressed. Governance and anti-corruption measures were key components of reforms under the SMP. The authorities have acted to strengthen accountability in the use of public resources and have boosted the transparency of public procurement for emergency resources. The recent finalization of revisions to the Central Bank Law and to the AML/CFT legal framework are also critical for improving governance and transparency. Sustaining progress on reforms to strengthen governance is paramount for ensuring inclusive growth and building the trust of the private sector and of development partners. The authorities' recent formal request of a Fund *Governance Diagnostic* is a welcome development.

28. Measures taken under the SMP to strengthen public financial management are needed to promote fiscal and macroeconomic stability and should continue. The authorities have successfully consolidated the main central budgetary accounts into one Treasury Single Account and adopted a three-year medium-term budget framework for the first time. Their improved budget presentation and execution will ensure greater accountability and transparency in public finances and help reduce fiscal dominance, as will the government's commitment to limit central bank financing of the NFPS deficit to 1½ percent of GDP. Going forward, the medium-term budget framework should be prepared at the line ministry level. The completed FY2021 financial audit of the BRH and publication of its audited financial statements was an important step in implementing the recommendations of the 2019 Safeguards Assessment, which staff urges the authorities to complete.

29. Continued strengthening of the social safety net will be essential for cushioning the impact of the shocks on the population and alleviating widespread poverty. Staff thus welcomed the authorities' detailed strategy to tackle food insecurity and looks forward to assessing the implementation of spending related to FSW resources. The authorities are taking meaningful steps toward implementing the fuel reform strategy. The technical assistance from the Fund on the consumer-pricing mechanism of fuel—which took place in January 2023—should allow changes in international fuel prices to be regularly passed on to consumers instead of ad hoc price/sudden price adjustments. Staff recommends that the authorities follow through with the implementation of this reform, following recent TA provided by FAD. The reform should be accompanied by mitigating measures together with an effective communication strategy, to protect the most vulnerable.

30. The authorities have strengthened the monetary policy and exchange rate frameworks and should continue to do so. The authorities moved toward greater exchange rate flexibility, which has helped rebuild reserves. They have also limited monetary financing of the deficit to less than 1½ percent of GDP. The revisions to the central bank law should allow the BRH to focus on its core policy goals of stabilizing prices while maintaining adequate liquidity and financial stability to support growth.

31. Data provision to the Fund for program and surveillance purposes has improved under the SMP and data gaps are being closed. The timeliness and periodicity of data provided to the Fund exceed the commitments of countries of comparable capacity under the Enhanced General Data Dissemination System (e-GDDS), for publication purposes—which the authorities are considering implementing in the future.

32. Based on Haiti's performance under the SMP, staff supports the completion of the Second Review. The authorities have expressed interest in another SMP, which should help lock in recent approved reforms and sustain them to further enhance economic resilience. The new SMP will continue to be supported with Fund capacity development assistance. In line with the Fund Strategy for Fragile and Conflict-Affected States, staff will also coordinate closely with Haiti's main development partners and produce an updated Country Engagement Strategy as part of the upcoming Article IV Consultation, scheduled for fall 2023.

Figure 1. Haiti: Real Sector Developments, 2016–23

Real GDP has contracted for the fourth consecutive year in FY2022[1] by 1.7 percent…

Contribution to GDP Growth (Supply-side)
(Percent)



…reflecting mostly a sharp decline in private consumption, investment, and net exports[1]…

Contribution to GDP Growth (Demand-side)
(Percent)



…and negative growth in all key sectors, particularly in agriculture, services…

Contribution to the Conjuctural Economic Activity Indicator (ICAE) Growth
(Percent, y/y)



…and construction.

Economic Activity Indicator
(Percent, y/y)



Inflation rose sharply, reaching almost 50 percent y/y in March.

Inflation
(Percent)



The output gap also widened, and unemployment increased.

Potential Growth and Unemployment
(Percent)



Sources: Haitian Institute of Statistics and Informatics (IHSI), Bank of the Republic of Haiti, and Fund staff estimates.

1/ On a fiscal-year basis, ending on September 30.

Figure 2. Haiti: Fiscal Sector Developments, 2016–23

Tax revenue has fallen since 2019…

Taxes
(Percent of GDP)



… while expenditure has remained stable.

Total Expenditure
(Percent of GDP)



The fiscal deficit has been driven by fuel subsidies until September 2022…

Central Government Deficit With and Without Energy Subsidies
(Percent of GDP)



…and had been largely monetized until then…

Financing by Source
(Billions of gourdes)



…raising also domestic debt.

Central Government Debt
(Percent of GDP)



A fuel price adjustment took place in September 2022, mitigating the pressure on public finances thereafter.

Fuel Prices and Net Revenues



Sources: National authorities and Fund staff calculations.

Figure 3. Haiti: Monetary and Financial Sectors Developments, 2016–23

Bank of Republic of Haiti's financing of the fiscal deficit …

Central Bank Financing to Government



… increased BRH net credit to the government.

Net Domestic Assets (NDA) of the Central Bank
(Billions of gourdes)



Private sector credit has been volatile….

Private Sector Credit



…as were the lending rates which periodically decoupled from the BRH policy rate.

Nominal Interest Rates
(Percent)



FX deposits and loans have been stable since August 2020, after the central bank revalued the gourde…

Dollarization



…while excess structural liquidity[1] is rising in the banking system.

Structural Liquidity Excess of Banking System
(Billions of gourdes)



Sources: Bank of the Republic of Haiti and Fund staff calculations.

1/ Excess reserves are reserves above requirement ratios on deposits; structural excess reserves include excess reserves plus other bank deposits at the BRH minus reserves banks obtain under BRH facilities.

Figure 4. Haiti: Financial Sector Indicators, 2016–22

The banking system has adequate reported capital buffers…

Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR)
(Percent)



… but relatively high non-performing loans and related provisions.

NPLs and Provisions
(Percent)



Profitability has recovered since the exchange rate shock of August 2020 and has been stable since…

Profitability
(Percent)



…while liquidity conditions remain favorable.

Liquid Assets to Total Assets Ratio
(Percent)



Sources: National authorities and Fund staff calculations.

Figure 5. Haiti: External Sector Developments, 2016–23

The current account swung into a deficit in 2022 after registering surpluses in 2020-21…

Exports and Imports

(Percent of GDP)



… while remittances (in dollar terms) are above pre-pandemic trend.

Remittances (net)



FDI has declined in recent years…

Composition of Capital and Financial Account

(Percent of GDP)



…while donor flows increased following the August 2021 earthquake.

Official Assistance



The REER has remained stable after its sharp appreciation in August 2020…

Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) and Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (NEER)

(Index)



…and external buffers have been rebuilt since November 2022.

International Reserves

(Millions of US dollars)



Sources: National authorities and staff calculations.

Figure 6. Haiti: Social Indicators

Political instability and security problems have taken a heavy toll on Haitian society...

Total Displaced Persons by Violence
(Number of people)



... and have reversed the small progress made in reducing poverty.

Poverty Rates
(Percent)



The absolute number of people undernourished has resumed its upward trend...

Number of People Undernourished
(Millions, 3-year average)



...although the undernourished as a percent of the population have been relatively steady since 2010.

Prevalence of Undernourishment
(Percent, 3-year average)



Sanitation rates are well below those in Fragile and Conflict-Affected states (FCS)...

People Using at Least Basic Sanitation Services and Basic Drinking Water
(Percent of population)



...although youth literacy is significantly above the FCS average and close to the world average.

Literacy rate
(Percent of people aged 15-24)



Sources: International Organization for Migration (IOM), Fed, World Bank, and Fund staff estimates.

Table 1. Haiti: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2020–28
(Fiscal year ending September 30)

Nominal GDP (2022): US$21.5 billion
Population (2021): 11.9 million

GDP per capita (2021): US$1,765
Percent of population below poverty line (2021): 52.3

	FY2020	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025	FY2026	FY2027	FY2028
			Est.	1st review	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.
	(Change over previous year; unless otherwise indicated)									
National income and prices										
GDP at constant prices	-3.3	-1.8	-1.7	0.3	0.1	1.2	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5
GDP deflator	20.6	19.3	29.8	33.4	43.9	18.4	16.4	14.9	12.8	11.3
Consumer prices (period average)	22.9	15.9	27.6	33.4	43.6	13.4	12.6	11.5	9.7	9.7
Consumer prices (end-of-period)	25.2	13.1	38.7	21.0	30.1	12.7	12.4	10.7	9.1	8.0
External Sector										
Exports (goods, valued in U.S. dollars, f.o.b.)	-26.3	27.7	13.6	4.8	5.2	6.6	6.5	6.7	6.7	7.2
Imports (goods, valued in U.S. dollars, f.o.b.)	-16.7	22.3	8.3	7.6	7.6	5.4	4.8	3.8	4.0	4.2
Remittances (valued in U.S. dollars)	6.0	21.1	-8.6	0.0	0.0	5.2	5.7	5.7	5.6	5.6
Real effective exchange rate (eop; + appreciation)	34.1	-5.2	7.3	…	…	…	…	…	…	…
Money and credit (valued in gourdes)										
Credit to private sector (in U.S. dollars and gourdes)	-11.2	15.2	17.4	9.4	11.0	11.6	12.5	13.1	13.6	14.2
Base money (currency in circulation and gourde deposits)	22.4	21.5	23.1	13.8	14.0	12.8	11.4	11.2	10.4	10.1
Broad money (excl. foreign currency deposits)	-0.3	38.2	21.1	13.0	14.4	12.0	11.4	10.6	10.4	10.1
	(In percent of GDP; unless otherwise indicated)									
Central government										
Overall balance (including grants)	-2.4	-2.6	-2.1	-2.0	-1.9	-1.8	-1.8	-2.1	-2.2	-2.4
Domestic revenue	6.2	5.9	5.3	6.6	6.4	6.7	7.3	7.6	7.7	7.8
Grants	1.3	2.3	2.7	2.5	2.3	2.0	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.9
Expenditures	9.9	10.8	10.2	11.1	10.6	10.6	11.0	11.6	11.8	12.2
Current expenditures	8.1	7.4	6.8	7.6	7.4	7.0	7.2	7.3	7.3	7.8
Capital expenditures	1.8	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.2	3.5	3.7	4.3	4.5	4.4
Overall balance of the nonfinancial public sector 1/	-3.2	-2.5	-2.1	-2.0	-1.9	-1.8	-1.8	-2.1	-2.2	-2.4
Savings and investment										
Gross investment	17.7	18.0	15.9	15.3	11.5	14.6	17.8	19.5	21.0	21.9
Of which: public investment	1.8	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.2	3.5	3.7	4.3	4.5	4.4
Gross national savings	18.8	18.5	13.5	14.5	10.7	14.1	17.2	18.8	20.2	20.9
External current account balance (incl. official grants)	1.1	0.5	-2.3	-0.8	-0.8	-0.5	-0.6	-0.7	-0.8	-1.0
Net fuel exports	-5.0	-3.1	-4.9	-4.2	-3.8	-3.2	-2.8	-2.6	-2.4	-2.2
Public debt										
External public debt (medium and long-term, eop)	10.5	12.9	12.9	11.1	9.9	9.1	8.5	8.1	7.7	7.9
Total public sector debt (end-of-period)	23.3	28.5	30.1	25.3	24.0	22.8	21.8	21.2	21.1	21.4
External public debt service 2/	12.5	9.5	8.0	8.6	8.7	8.1	8.2	8.3	7.5	7.8
Memorandum items:	(In millions of dollars, unless otherwise indicated)									
Net international reserves (program definition)	677	452	90	203	250	260	311	378	447	587
Gross international reserves	2,501	2,534	2,067	2,348	2,217	2,242	2,267	2,292	2,367	2,517
In months of imports of the following year	5.8	5.4	4.1	4.5	4.3	4.1	4.0	3.9	3.9	3.7
Nominal GDP (millions of gourdes)	1,449,888	1,699,208	2,168,223	2,857,327	3,122,964	3,741,391	4,421,231	5,155,565	5,904,558	6,673,342
Nominal GDP (millions of U.S. dollars)	14,508	21,017	20,535	24,236	26,409	28,576	30,564	32,681	34,769	36,922

Sources: Ministry of Economy and Finance; Bank of the Republic of Haiti; World Bank; Fund staff estimates and projections.

1/ Includes transfers to the state-owned electricity company (EDH), and unsettled payment obligations.

2/ In percent of exports of goods and nonfactor services. Includes debt relief.

Table 2a. Haiti: Non-Financial Public Sector Operations, 2020–28
(Fiscal year ending September 30; in millions of gourdes)

	FY2020	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025	FY2026	FY2027	FY2028
			Est.	1st review	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.
Total revenue and grants	**108,524**	**139,852**	**173,690**	**259,708**	**271,510**	**326,505**	**406,154**	**489,238**	**568,561**	**647,949**
Domestic revenue	90,046	100,635	114,919	187,736	199,320	250,912	324,667	390,759	456,149	518,610
Domestic taxes	52,378	74,012	82,525	115,961	126,521	155,354	203,036	243,462	281,193	320,474
Customs duties	21,127	22,613	27,341	64,842	65,333	86,389	110,531	134,045	159,423	180,180
Of which: fuel taxes	0	0	0	30,554	27,858	34,010	35,056	40,879	46,818	52,913
Other current revenue	16,541	4,009	5,053	6,933	7,466	9,169	11,100	13,253	15,532	17,955
Grants	18,478	39,217	58,771	71,972	72,190	75,593	81,487	98,479	112,412	129,339
Budget support 1/	3,868	1,321	446	9,432	9,460	5,892	6,509	7,099	7,757	11,057
Project grants	14,610	37,897	58,325	62,540	62,730	69,702	74,977	91,380	104,656	118,282
Total expenditure 2/	**143,265**	**184,164**	**220,167**	**317,276**	**330,791**	**395,653**	**484,871**	**596,297**	**697,121**	**811,324**
Current expenditure	117,479	126,058	146,602	216,159	229,707	263,274	320,411	374,080	429,985	520,542
Wages and salaries	45,333	55,130	63,030	94,292	103,058	127,207	154,743	180,445	206,660	233,567
Goods and services	32,119	35,472	32,504	57,147	62,459	74,828	88,425	103,111	118,091	133,467
Interest payments	3,604	6,014	6,596	6,181	6,181	6,981	8,705	10,602	13,110	16,690
Transfers and subsidies	27,984	28,842	44,473	58,540	58,008	54,258	68,539	79,922	92,124	136,818
Of which: Transfers to EDH	11,838	9,111	7,411	10,506	10,937	13,103	15,484	18,056	20,679	23,371
Of which: Fuel direct subsidies to oil companies	8,844	10,682	31,242	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Exceptional expenditures 3/	8,439	600	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Capital expenditure	25,786	58,107	73,564	101,117	101,084	132,379	164,459	222,216	267,136	290,782
Domestically financed	12,334	15,359	11,789	38,577	38,078	49,585	72,123	110,190	138,361	143,430
Foreign-financed	13,452	42,748	61,775	62,540	63,006	82,794	92,336	112,027	128,775	147,352
Central government balance including grants	**-34,741**	**-44,312**	**-46,477**	**-57,568**	**-59,280**	**-69,148**	**-78,717**	**-107,059**	**-128,560**	**-163,375**
Excluding grants and externally financed projects	-39,767	-40,782	-43,473	-67,000	-68,465	-61,946	-67,867	-93,511	-112,198	-145,362
Primary balance of NFPS, incl. grants and other transfers to EDH	**-31,137**	**-38,298**	**-39,881**	**-51,387**	**-53,099**	**-62,167**	**-70,012**	**-96,457**	**-115,450**	**-146,685**
Adjustment (unsettled payment obligations)	11,059	-2,031	-256	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Overall balance of NFPS, including grants	**-45,800**	**-42,282**	**-46,220**	**-57,568**	**-59,280**	**-69,148**	**-78,717**	**-107,059**	**-128,560**	**-163,375**
Financing, NFPS	**45,800**	**42,282**	**46,220**	**57,568**	**59,280**	**69,148**	**78,717**	**107,059**	**128,560**	**163,375**
External net financing	-6,728	-5,865	-1,468	-11,110	-10,868	649	3,661	5,647	7,884	11,249
Loans (net)	-6,728	-2,640	-5,822	-11,110	-10,868	649	3,661	5,647	7,884	11,249
Disbursements	2,281	4,851	3,450	0	276	13,093	17,359	20,647	24,119	29,070
Amortization	-9,009	-7,491	-9,272	-11,110	-11,144	-12,444	-13,697	-14,999	-16,235	-17,820
Arrears (net)	0	-3,225	4,354	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Internal net financing	52,527	48,147	47,689	68,678	70,148	68,499	75,055	101,411	120,676	152,126
Banking system	50,584	54,916	60,877	68,678	70,148	68,499	75,055	101,411	120,676	152,126
BRH (includes the FSW) 4/	41,255	51,165	49,714	58,182	44,920	54,250	64,108	74,756	85,616	96,763
Commercial banks	9,329	3,751	11,163	10,496	25,229	14,249	10,948	26,656	35,060	55,362
Nonbank financing 5/	1,943	-6,769	-13,188	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Memorandum items										
Forgone fuel taxes and fuel direct subsidies	29,332	31,984	62,553	2,021	-1,473	-9,694	-8,892	-10,368	-11,875	-13,421
o/w Forgone fuel taxes	20,488	21,302	31,311	2,021	-1,473	-9,694	-8,892	-10,368	-11,875	-13,421
o/w Fuel direct subsidies to oil companies	8,844	10,682	31,242	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Health, education and agriculture spending	29,050	28,173	36,860	50,003	54,652	67,345	81,793	97,956	112,187	126,794
Nominal GDP	1,449,888	1,699,208	2,168,223	2,857,327	3,122,964	3,741,391	4,421,231	5,155,565	5,904,558	6,673,342

Sources: Ministry of Finance and Economy; and Fund staff estimates and projections.

1/ Includes previously-programmed multilateral budget support that could be delayed, as well as CCRT debt relief.

2/ Commitment basis, except for domestically financed spending, which is reported on the basis of project account replenishments.

3/ Includes all COVID-related expenditures for FY2020 and FY2021.

4/ Amounts include RCF financing for FY2020, the full two-year debt-relief under the CCRT for FY2021, and the FSW disbursement for FY2023.

5/ Includes the net change in the stock of government securities held by non-banks, of checks that are not yet cashed, of supplier credits and of domestic arrears.
Additional consolidation of social expenditures expected details yet to be provided of the 2022 budget.

Table 2b. Haiti: Non-Financial Public Sector Operations, 2020–28
(Fiscal year ending September 30; in percent of GDP)

	FY2020	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025	FY2026	FY2027	FY2028
			Est.	1st review	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.
Total revenue and grants	**7.5**	**8.2**	**8.0**	**9.1**	**8.7**	**8.7**	**9.2**	**9.5**	**9.6**	**9.7**
Domestic revenue	6.2	5.9	5.3	6.6	6.4	6.7	7.3	7.6	7.7	7.8
Domestic taxes	3.6	4.4	3.8	4.1	4.1	4.2	4.6	4.7	4.8	4.8
Customs duties	1.5	1.3	1.3	2.3	2.1	2.3	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.7
Of which: fuel taxes	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8
Other current revenue	1.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Grants	1.3	2.3	2.7	2.5	2.3	2.0	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.9
Budget support 1/	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2
Project grants	1.0	2.2	2.7	2.2	2.0	1.9	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.8
Total expenditure 2/	**9.9**	**10.8**	**10.2**	**11.1**	**10.6**	**10.6**	**11.0**	**11.6**	**11.8**	**12.2**
Current expenditure	8.1	7.4	6.8	7.6	7.4	7.0	7.2	7.3	7.3	7.8
Wages and salaries	3.1	3.2	2.9	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5
Goods and services	2.2	2.1	1.5	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
Interest payments	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3
Transfers and subsidies	1.9	1.7	2.1	2.0	1.9	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.6	2.1
Of which: Transfers to EDH	0.8	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
Of which: Fuel direct subsidies to oil companies	0.6	0.6	1.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Exceptional expenditures 3/	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Capital expenditure	1.8	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.2	3.5	3.7	4.3	4.5	4.4
Domestically financed	0.9	0.9	0.5	1.4	1.2	1.3	1.6	2.1	2.3	2.1
Foreign-financed	0.9	2.5	2.8	2.2	2.0	2.2	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.2
Central government balance including grants	**-2.4**	**-2.6**	**-2.1**	**-2.0**	**-1.9**	**-1.8**	**-1.8**	**-2.1**	**-2.2**	**-2.4**
Excluding grants and externally financed projects	-2.7	-2.4	-2.0	-2.3	-2.2	-1.7	-1.5	-1.8	-1.9	-2.2
Primary balance of NFPS, incl. grants and other transfers to EDH	**-2.1**	**-2.3**	**-1.8**	**-1.8**	**-1.7**	**-1.7**	**-1.6**	**-1.9**	**-2.0**	**-2.2**
Adjustment (unsettled payment obligations)	0.8	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Overall balance of NFPS, including grants	**-3.2**	**-2.5**	**-2.1**	**-2.0**	**-1.9**	**-1.8**	**-1.8**	**-2.1**	**-2.2**	**-2.4**
Financing, NFPS	**3.2**	**2.5**	**2.1**	**2.0**	**1.9**	**1.8**	**1.8**	**2.1**	**2.2**	**2.4**
External net financing	-0.5	-0.3	-0.1	-0.4	-0.3	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2
Loans (net)	-0.5	-0.2	-0.3	-0.4	-0.3	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2
Disbursements	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
Amortization	-0.6	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3
Arrears (net)	0.0	-0.2	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Internal net financing	3.6	2.8	2.2	2.4	2.2	1.8	1.7	2.0	2.0	2.3
Banking system	3.5	3.2	2.8	2.4	2.2	1.8	1.7	2.0	2.0	2.3
BRH (includes the FSW) 4/	2.8	3.0	2.3	2.0	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5
Commercial banks	0.6	0.2	0.5	0.4	0.8	0.4	0.2	0.5	0.6	0.8
Nonbank financing 5/	0.1	-0.4	-0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Memorandum items										
Forgone fuel taxes and fuel direct subsidies	2.0	1.9	2.9	0.1	0.0	-0.3	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2
o/w Forgone fuel taxes	1.4	1.3	1.4	0.1	0.0	-0.3	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2
o/w Fuel direct subsidies to oil companies	0.6	0.6	1.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Health, education and agriculture spending	2.0	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9
Nominal GDP (millions of gourdes)	1,449,888	1,699,208	2,168,223	2,857,327	3,122,964	3,741,391	4,421,231	5,155,565	5,904,558	6,673,342

Sources: Ministry of Finance and Economy; and Fund staff estimates and projections.

1/ Includes previously-programmed multilateral budget support that could be delayed, as well as CCRT debt relief.

2/ Commitment basis, except for domestically financed spending, which is reported on the basis of project account replenishments.

3/ Includes all COVID-related expenditures for FY2020 and FY2021.

4/ Amounts include RCF financing for FY2020, the full two-year debt-relief under the CCRT for FY2021, and the FSW disbursement for FY2023.

5/ Includes the net change in the stock of government securities held by non-banks, of checks that are not yet cashed, of supplier credits and of domestic arrears.

Table 3a. Haiti: Balance of Payments, 2020–28

(In millions of U.S. dollars on a fiscal year basis; unless otherwise indicated)

	FY2020	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025	FY2026	FY2027	FY2028
			Est.	1st review	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.
Current account (including grants)	**158**	**98**	**-481**	**-199**	**-207**	**-139**	**-184**	**-229**	**-290**	**-380**
Current account (excluding grants)	**32**	**-36**	**-705**	**-810**	**-818**	**-717**	**-747**	**-274**	**-336**	**-441**
Trade balance	-2,879	-3,474	-3,701	-4,030	-4,012	-4,215	-4,395	-4,521	-4,658	-4,801
Exports of goods	885	1,130	1,284	1,339	1,351	1,441	1,534	1,637	1,747	1,873
Of which: Assembly industry	824	1,071	1,205	1,259	1,270	1,350	1,440	1,538	1,644	1,768
Imports of goods	-3,764	-4,604	-4,985	-5,369	-5,364	-5,656	-5,930	-6,158	-6,404	-6,673
Of which: Fossil fuels	-720	-643	-1,005	-1,009	-1,003	-903	-868	-843	-824	-814
Services (net)	-313	-464	-532	-493	-493	-416	-421	-407	-390	-500
Receipts	129	124	118	150	150	156	158	171	184	199
Payments	-441	-589	-650	-643	-643	-573	-579	-578	-574	-699
Income (net)	29	23	23	61	66	87	113	127	139	148
Current transfers (net)	3,321	4,013	3,729	4,263	4,233	4,404	4,520	4,572	4,618	4,774
Official transfers (net)	126	135	224	610	610	577	563	45	46	61
Private transfers (net)	2,906	3,518	3,215	3,216	3,216	3,383	3,574	3,776	3,989	4,214
Other transfers (net)	290	360	290	437	406	444	382	750	583	499
Capital and financial accounts	**-104**	**-72**	**61**	**126**	**264**	**164**	**209**	**254**	**365**	**530**
Capital transfers	58	54	57	13	13	19	19	0	0	0
Public sector capital flows (net)	-75	-35	20	-106	-106	-6	5	45	52	256
Loan disbursements	23	60	30	0	0	100	120	170	170	355
Amortization	-98	-95	-10	-106	-106	-106	-115	-125	-118	-99
Foreign direct investment (net)	25	51	57	97	106	114	122	173	277	172
Banks (net) 1/	-76	-162	50	46	76	37	33	63	93	97
Other items (net) 2/	-35	18	-123	76	176	0	29	-26	-57	5
Errors and omissions	**85**	**-29**	**-123**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
Overall balance	**139**	**-4**	**-543**	**-73**	**57**	**25**	**25**	**25**	**75**	**150**
Financing	**-139**	**4**	**542**	**73**	**-57**	**-25**	**-25**	**-25**	**-75**	**-150**
Change in net foreign assets (+ is decrease)	-350	-91	467	-20	-150	-25	-25	-25	-75	-150
o/w Change in gross reserves (+ is decrease)	-350	-91	467	-20	-150	-25	-25	-25	-75	-150
Change in IMF credit and loans (+ is increase)	106	-5	-10	93	93	0	0	0	0	0
Exceptional financing	104	101	86	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
o/w Changes in arrears 3/	96	90	81	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
o/w Debt rescheduling and debt relief 4/	3	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Memorandum items:										
Change in US$ denom. reserve deposits at BRH (+ is decrease)	-246	-164	68	116	0	34	2	-23	-27	-43
Change in NIR (program definition) (+ is decrease)	55	225	362	-61	-161	-9	-52	-67	-69	-139
Exports of goods, f.o.b (percent change)	-26.3	27.7	13.6	4.8	5.2	6.6	6.5	6.7	7	7.2
Imports of goods, f.o.b (percent change)	-16.7	22.3	8.3	7.6	7.6	5.4	4.8	3.8	4	4.2
Projected average oil price (U.S. dollars per barrel, APSP)	41.8	69.2	96.4	81.1	81.3	76.8	72.7	69.6	67.0	64.8
Debt service (in percent of exports of goods and services)	12.5	9.5	8.0	8.6	8.7	8.1	8.2	8.3	7.5	7.8
Gross international reserves (in millions of U.S. dollars)	2,501	2,534	2,067	2,348	2,217	2,242	2,267	2,292	2,367	2,517
(in months of next year's imports of goods and services)	5.8	5.4	4.1	4.5	4.3	4.1	4.0	3.9	3.9	3.7
Nominal GDP (millions of U.S. dollars)	14,508	21,017	20,535	24,236	26,409	28,576	30,564	32,681	34,769	36,922

Sources: Bank of the Republic of Haiti; and Fund staff estimates and projections.

1/ Change in net foreign assets of commercial banks.

2/ Includes arrears on oil imports.

3/ Includes debt to Venezuela for oil shipments already paid by the GOH in local currency but not yet cleared in U.S. dollars.

4/ Includes the CCRT debt relief.

Table 3b. Haiti: Balance of Payments, 2020–28

(In percent of GDP on a fiscal year basis; unless otherwise indicated)

	FY2020	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025	FY2026	FY2027	FY2028
			Est.	1st review	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.
Current account (including grants)	**1.1**	**0.5**	**-2.3**	**-0.8**	**-0.8**	**-0.5**	**-0.6**	**-0.7**	**-0.8**	**-1.0**
Current account (excluding grants)	**0.2**	**-0.2**	**-3.4**	**-3.3**	**-3.1**	**-2.5**	**-2.4**	**-0.8**	**-1.0**	**-1.2**
Trade balance	-19.8	-16.5	-18.0	-16.6	-15.2	-14.8	-14.4	-13.8	-13.4	-13.0
Exports of goods	6.1	5.4	6.3	5.5	5.1	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.1
Of which: Assembly industry	5.7	5.1	5.9	5.2	4.8	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.8
Imports of goods	-25.9	-21.9	-24.3	-22.2	-20.3	-19.8	-19.4	-18.8	-18.4	-18.1
Of which: Fossil fuels	-5.0	-3.1	-4.9	-4.2	-3.8	-3.2	-2.8	-2.6	-2.4	-2.2
Services (net)	-2.2	-2.2	-2.6	-2.0	-1.9	-1.5	-1.4	-1.2	-1.1	-1.4
Receipts	0.9	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Payments	-3.0	-2.8	-3.2	-2.7	-2.4	-2.0	-1.9	-1.8	-1.7	-1.9
Income (net)	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
Current transfers (net)	22.9	19.1	18.2	17.6	16.0	15.4	14.8	14.0	13.3	12.9
Official transfers (net)	0.9	0.6	1.1	2.5	2.3	2.0	1.8	0.1	0.1	0.2
Private transfers (net)	20.0	16.7	15.7	13.3	12.2	11.8	11.7	11.6	11.5	11.4
Other transfers (net)	2.0	1.7	1.4	1.8	1.5	1.6	1.2	2.3	1.7	1.4
Capital and financial accounts	**-0.7**	**-0.3**	**0.3**	**0.5**	**1.0**	**0.6**	**0.7**	**0.8**	**1.1**	**1.4**
Capital transfers	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Public sector capital flows (net)	-0.5	-0.2	0.1	-0.4	-0.4	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.7
Loan disbursements	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5	1.0
Amortization	-0.7	-0.5	0.0	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4	-0.3	-0.3
Foreign direct investment (net)	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.8	0.5
Banks (net) 1/	-0.5	-0.8	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3
Other items (net) 2/	-0.2	0.1	-0.6	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.1	-0.1	-0.2	0.0
Errors and omissions	**0.6**	**-0.1**	**-0.6**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**
Overall balance	**1.0**	**0.0**	**-2.6**	**-0.3**	**0.2**	**0.1**	**0.1**	**0.1**	**0.2**	**0.4**
Financing	**-1.0**	**0.0**	**2.6**	**0.3**	**-0.2**	**-0.1**	**-0.1**	**-0.1**	**-0.2**	**-0.4**
Change in net foreign assets (+ is decrease)	-2.4	-0.4	2.3	-0.1	-0.6	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.2	-0.4
Change in IMF credit and loans (+ is increase)	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Exceptional financing	0.7	0.5	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
o/w Changes in arrears 3/	0.7	0.4	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
o/w Debt rescheduling and debt relief 4/	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Memorandum items:										
Exports of goods, f.o.b (percent change)	-26.3	27.7	13.6	4.8	5.2	6.6	6.5	6.7	6.7	7.2
Imports of goods, f.o.b (percent change)	-16.7	22.3	8.3	7.6	7.6	5.4	4.8	3.8	4.0	4.2
Projected average oil price (U.S. dollars per barrel, APSP)	41.8	69.2	96.4	81.1	81.3	76.8	72.7	69.6	67.0	64.8
Debt service (in percent of exports of goods and services)	12.5	9.5	8.0	8.6	8.7	8.1	8.2	8.3	7.5	7.8
Nominal exchange rate	99.9	80.9	105.6	…	…	…	…	…	…	…
Gross international reserves (in millions of U.S. dollars)	2,501	2,534	2,067	2,348	2,217	2,242	2,267	2,292	2,367	2,517
(in months of next year's imports of goods and services)	5.8	5.4	4.1	4.5	4.3	4.1	4.0	3.9	3.9	3.7
Nominal GDP (millions of U.S. dollars)	14,508	21,017	20,535	24,236	26,409	28,576	30,564	32,681	34,769	36,922

Sources: Bank of the Republic of Haiti; and Fund staff estimates and projections.

1/ Change in net foreign assets of commercial banks.

2/ Includes arrears on oil imports.

3/ Includes debt to Venezuela for oil shipments already paid by the GOH in local currency but not yet cleared in U.S. dollars.

4/ Includes the CCRT debt relief.

Table 4. Haiti: Summary Accounts of the Banking System, 2020–28

	FY2020	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025	FY2026	FY2027	FY2028
			Est.	1st review	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.
				I. Central bank						
Net foreign assets	117,208	146,005	131,774	151,422	156,187	169,936	194,561	225,384	258,785	307,530
(In millions of U.S. dollars)	1,778	1,499	1,120	1,237	1,274	1,249	1,299	1,388	1,484	1,666
Of which: Net international reserves (in millions of U.S. dollars) 1/	677	452	90	203	250	260	311	378	447	587
Of which : Commercial bank forex deposits (in millions of U.S. dollars)	1,160	1,324	1,255	1,331	1,255	1,221	1,219	1,242	1,269	1,312
Net domestic assets	37,550	42,096	99,713	94,475	107,785	127,831	137,066	143,415	148,472	140,942
Net credit to the nonfinancial public sector	109,964	159,923	215,025	255,441	259,945	314,195	378,303	453,058	538,674	635,438
Of which: Net credit to the central government	112,194	162,197	219,409	257,714	264,328	318,579	382,686	457,442	543,058	639,822
Claims on central government	143,984	200,974	269,884	296,292	314,804	369,054	433,162	507,917	593,534	690,297
Central government deposits	31,791	38,777	50,475	38,577	50,475	50,475	50,475	50,475	50,475	50,475
Of which: IMF CCRT debt relief	-4,686	-2,634	-2,087	-4,119	-2,926	-3,766	-4,605	-4,605	-4,605	-4,605
Liabilities to commercial banks (excl. gourde deposits)	81,390	138,460	157,539	179,381	173,340	186,599	204,075	224,061	244,819	265,633
BRH bonds/Open market operations	841	3,525	2,630	10,453	12,283	13,283	14,283	15,283	16,283	16,283
Commercial bank forex deposits	80,549	134,935	154,909	168,928	161,057	173,316	189,793	208,779	228,536	249,350
Other	8,976	20,632	42,227	18,416	21,181	235	-37,161	-85,582	-145,384	-228,863
Base money	154,758	188,101	231,487	245,898	263,973	297,768	331,626	368,799	407,257	448,472
Currency in circulation	96,234	108,670	133,411	134,590	151,199	171,161	193,019	216,586	241,770	269,622
Commercial bank gourde deposits	58,524	79,431	98,077	111,307	112,774	126,607	138,607	152,214	165,487	178,850
				II. Consolidated banking system						
Net foreign assets	150,596	205,868	203,476	214,894	226,119	242,532	269,459	296,332	318,787	353,132
(In millions of U.S. dollars)	2,285	2,114	1,729	1,756	1,844	1,782	1,799	1,825	1,828	1,913
Of which: Commercial banks NFA (in millions of U.S. dollars)	506	615	609	519	533	496	463	400	307	210
Net domestic assets	219,132	305,095	415,158	444,112	481,327	549,531	612,667	679,142	758,408	833,077
Credit to the nonfinancial public sector	130,870	199,795	273,762	321,758	343,910	412,409	487,465	588,876	709,552	861,678
Of which: Net credit to the central government	130,870	195,957	271,085	317,921	341,233	409,732	484,788	586,199	706,875	859,001
Claims on central government	178,659	252,599	339,657	374,362	409,805	478,304	553,359	592,874	713,550	865,676
Central government deposits	47,789	56,641	68,572	56,441	68,572	68,572	68,572	6,675	6,675	6,675
Credit to the private sector	115,840	133,478	156,717	155,470	173,926	194,136	218,341	246,952	280,569	320,464
In gourdes	70,344	72,552	77,196	84,093	86,031	96,028	108,001	122,153	138,781	158,515
In foreign currency	45,495	60,926	79,521	71,376	87,895	98,108	110,341	124,799	141,788	161,949
Other	-27,577	-28,178	-15,321	-33,116	-36,510	-57,014	-93,139	-156,686	-231,713	-349,065
Broad money	369,728	510,963	618,634	659,006	707,447	792,062	882,126	975,474	1,077,195	1,186,209
Currency in circulation	85,390	98,150	123,511	124,070	141,299	161,261	183,119	206,686	231,870	259,722
Gourde deposits	114,581	134,373	157,617	158,548	172,023	200,398	226,589	256,205	289,461	326,443
Foreign currency deposits	165,194	270,986	329,793	370,768	386,297	426,096	471,990	520,176	570,258	622,837
(In millions of U.S. dollars)	2,506	2,782	2,802	3,030	3,151	3,131	3,151	3,204	3,270	3,374
				(12-month percentage change)						
Currency in circulation	40.6	14.9	25.8	12.2	14.4	14.1	13.6	12.9	12.2	12.0
Base money	22.4	21.5	23.1	13.8	14.0	12.8	11.4	11.2	10.4	10.1
Broad money (M3)	-0.3	38.2	21.1	13.0	14.4	12.0	11.4	10.6	10.4	10.1
Gourde deposits	26.4	17.3	17.3	13.5	9.1	16.5	13.1	13.1	13.0	12.8
Foreign currency deposits	-23.4	64.0	21.7	14.9	17.1	10.3	10.8	10.2	9.6	9.2
Credit to the private sector	-11.2	15.2	17.4	9.4	11.0	11.6	12.5	13.1	13.6	14.2
Credit in gourdes	16.8	3.1	6.4	9.4	11.4	11.6	12.5	13.1	13.6	14.2
Credit in foreign currency	-35.2	33.9	30.5	9.4	10.5	11.6	12.5	13.1	13.6	14.2
Memorandum items:										
Foreign currency deposits (% of total private deposits)	59.7	67.4	68.3	70.0	69.1	68.0	67.6	67.0	66.4	65.7
Foreign curr. credit to priv. sector (% of total)	39.2	45.5	50.5	45.9	50.5	50.5	50.5	50.5	50.5	50.5
Commercial banks' credit to private sector (% of GDP)	8.0	7.9	7.2	5.4	5.6	5.2	4.9	5.9	5.7	5.3

Sources: Bank of the Republic of Haiti; and Fund staff estimates and projections.

1/ Program definition. Excludes commercial bank forex deposits, letters of credit, guarantees, earmarked project accounts and US$ denominated bank reserves. A portion of SDR allocation is in NIR.

Table 5. Haiti: External Financing Requirements and Sources, 2020–28
(In millions of US$ on a fiscal year basis; unless otherwise indicated) 1/

	FY2020	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025	FY2026	FY2027	FY2028
			Est.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.
Requirements	**66**	**131**	**715**	**924**	**823**	**862**	**400**	**454**	**539**
Current account deficit, excluding grants	-32	36	705	818	717	747	274	336	441
Debt amortization, excluding repayments to the IMF	98	95	10	106	106	115	125	118	99
Sources	**-145**	**36**	**639**	**831**	**823**	**862**	**400**	**454**	**539**
Capital transfers, excluding official transfers	58	54	57	13	19	19	0	0	0
Foreign direct investment	25	51	57	106	114	122	173	277	172
Official disbursements, excluding budget support	116	190	254	530	632	638	170	170	355
Of which: Project loans	23	60	30	0	100	120	170	170	355
Other flows, including commercial banks (net)	-27	-173	-196	159	37	62	37	36	102
Official budget support 2/	33	5	0	80	45	45	45	46	61
Change in central bank's NFA (+ is decrease) 3/	-350	-91	467	-150	-25	-25	-25	-75	-150
Additional Financing	**211**	**95**	**76**	**93**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
IMF disbursement under RCF	111	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
IMF debt relief under CCRT	6	11	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
Change in existing obligations to the IMF (+ is increase)	-5	-5	-10	93	0	0			
Debt rescheduling and debt relief, excluding the Fund	3	-1	0	0	0	0			
Change in arrears 4/	96	90	81	0	0	0	0	0	0
Memorandum items:									
Gross international reserves 5/	2,501	2,534	2,067	2,217	2,242	2,267	2,292	2,367	2,517
(in months of next year's imports of goods and services)	5.8	5.4	4.1	4.3	4.1	4.0	3.9	3.9	3.7
SDR allocation	0	224	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Sources: Bank of the Republic of Haiti; and Fund staff estimates and projections.
1/ Components may not exactly match up to totals due to rounding.
2/ Includes previously-programmed multilateral budget support that could be delayed.
3/ Excluding exceptional financing.
4/ Includes debt to Venezuela for oil shipments already paid by the GOH in local currency but not yet cleared in U.S. dollars.
5/ Includes gold.

Table 6. Haiti: Financial Soundness Indicators, June 2020–December 2022

(In percent; unless otherwise stated)

	Jun-20	Sep-20	Dec-20	Mar-21	Jun-21	Sep-21	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22
Size and growth											
Asset volume (in US$ millions)	4332.7	4319.1	5754.2	5745.0	5340.4	5341.3	5320.3	5267.8	5216.4	5238.7	4770.9
Deposit volume (in US$ millions)	3554.5	3382.5	4577.6	4613.0	4318.4	4351.5	4327.3	4275.6	4303.6	4294.2	3942.0
Asset growth (in gourde terms), y/y	23.5	-6.7	1.0	3.9	0.9	38.8	32.2	23.7	20.6	17.3	28.2
Credit growth (net, in gourde terms), y/y	5.7	-13.7	-8.3	-5.0	-2.1	21.2	20.6	18.8	12.1	14.6	23.3
Capital adequacy											
Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets	21.3	26.2	27.3	22.6	18.4	22.3	20.8	21.4	20.7	18.2	20.3
Regulatory capital to assets	7.4	9.2	9.3	8.1	7.0	7.9	7.6	7.5	7.2	6.5	7.0
Asset quality and composition											
Loans (net) to assets	26.8	28.7	27.1	25.8	26.0	25.1	24.8	24.8	24.2	24.5	23.8
NPLs to gross loans	8.0	5.0	5.4	7.1	5.9	5.6	6.3	7.8	8.7	6.7	10.9
Provisions to gross NPLs	63.0	105.4	107.5	81.8	101.6	103.1	96.5	77.8	71.3	89.5	57.2
Earnings and profitability											
Cumulative since beginning of calendar year											
Return on assets (ROA)	2.1	1.2	1.4	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.0	1.9	2.4	1.7	2.6
Return on equity (ROE)	24.1	12.4	14.4	21.4	23.0	23.2	21.5	21.2	26.1	21.2	30.5
Net interest income to gross income	50.1	57.1	55.0	52.6	50.2	51.1	51.6	51.4	45.6	53.5	49.5
Operating expenses to net profits	58.5	71.4	68.1	57.0	57.4	58.6	59.4	62.9	56.1	60.5	50.8
Efficiency											
Interest rate spread 1/	8.6	9.7	8.6	9.9	9.3	9.4	9.1	9.0	8.8	9.9	9.1
Liquidity											
Liquid assets to total assets 2/	49.2	45.3	47.3	48.6	48.1	50.3	48.5	47.8	48.2	47.5	47.4
Liquid assets to deposits 2/	60.0	57.8	59.4	60.6	59.4	61.8	59.6	58.8	58.4	57.9	57.3
Dollarization											
Foreign currency loans to total loans (net)	57.0	40.0	42.8	45.5	43.5	44.9	47.2	47.7	52.2	50.5	55.9
Foreign currency deposits to total deposits	70.6	58.5	59.6	60.1	63.8	66.1	66.5	66.3	66.9	67.3	71.7
Foreign currency loans to foreign currency deposits	26.4	25.1	24.5	24.3	21.9	20.9	21.6	22.0	22.8	22.4	22.5

Source: BRH Banking System Financial Summary and IMF staff calculations. These indicators reflect the aggregated results of the eight licensed banks in operation in Haiti; thus figures in this table may not exactly match the information in Table 4, which reflect the

1/ Defined as the difference between average lending rate and average fixed deposit rate in the banking system.

2/ Liquid assets comprise cash and central bank bonds.

Appendix I. Letter of Intent

Port-au-Prince
May 26, 2023

Ms. Kristalina Georgieva
Managing Director
International Monetary Fund
Washington, D.C., 20431, U.S.A.

Madam Managing Director:

1. The Staff Monitored Program (SMP) approved in June 2022 has been a great help to us in anchoring our macroeconomic policies and our structural reforms, despite the multiple challenges our country faces. The spillovers from the Russian invasion of Ukraine have increased our economic fragility and the recent cholera outbreak has compounded the suffering of our people. With the global landscape deteriorating, our domestic structural weaknesses have grown more severe and have tested our resilience. We are also deeply grateful to you for the SDR 81.9 million (50 percent of Haiti's quota) financial assistance the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has provided our country under the Food Shock Window (FSW) of the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF), in January 2023. This assistance has been critical in enabling us to meet urgent balance-of-payments needs arising from the war in Ukraine, and, in particular, to mitigate the impact on hunger and food insecurity in our country. Owing to external shocks and the internal escalation of violence, macroeconomic prospects have become more challenging relative to the outlook on June 17, 2022—when you approved our SMP.

2. We are most grateful to the Fund for its support and for the technical assistance provided us in implementing our structural reform agenda. Every structural benchmark has been mapped with CD provision. We greatly benefitted from the synergies between capacity development and the SMP, as part of the implementation of the new IMF Strategy for Strategy for Fragile and Conflict-Affected States (which provides for a more tailored capacity development approach anchored in the fragility context).

3. Macroeconomic conditions remain challenging. Economic growth has continued to be weak, and it contracted for the fourth consecutive year in the fiscal year ending September 30, 2022, by 1.7 percent. Growth will likely be muted this year. Year-on-year inflation grew to 48.3 percent in March from 38.7 percent in September, largely reflecting the surge in global food prices. Going forward, however, inflation (year-on-year) is expected to decelerate steadily to about 31 percent by the end of FY2022-23, owing to the stabilization of food and fuel prices in world markets.

4. On fiscal policy, we expect to end this fiscal year with an overall deficit for the nonfinancial public sector of 1.9 percent of GDP, somewhat below the 2 percent projected at the time of the First Review of the SMP. Buffers have been rebuilt and reserved reached US$396 million in April 2023. The first half of the 12-month SMP program saw progress on structural reforms in a number of key areas, despite the considerable challenges cited earlier. We completed the FY2021 financial audit of the BRH and published the audited financial statements. We have been publishing all public

procurement contracts awarded since the publication of the November 9, 2021 procurement decree No. 52, including information on the beneficial owners of successful bidders (monthly structural benchmark). With the benefit of technical assistance from the IMF's Fiscal Affairs Department, the Treasury Single Account (TSA) at the central bank has been expanded to include the main central budgetary units, including the emergency fund (end-September 2022 structural benchmark). We have also restored the regular functioning of the Board of Directors of the Economic and Social Assistance Fund (FAES), which now meets quarterly, and we are publishing the consolidated quarterly financial statements of the FAES (quarterly structural benchmark).

5. Performance under the 2022 SMP since the First Review has been satisfactory overall, given the domestic and international constraints and the political transition we are undergoing. In particular, we have met most of the indicative targets and benchmarks agreed with Fund staff for the end of the SMP program:

- *Quantitative and indicative targets (Appendix 1. Table 1)*. At the end of December 2022, we met by a large margin the quantitative targets on the floor for net international reserves of the central bank, the primary balance of the NFPS, and the ceiling for the net central bank credit to the NFPS. The end-December target on the minimum budget allocation to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (MAST) was missed as we were designing a detailed strategy to tackle food insecurity and strengthen the social safety net, in light of the disbursement under the FSW. We met two continuous QTs on arrears and one on no new contracting or guaranteeing by the public sector of non-concessional external debt. We also met four of the five ITs for end-March 2023 and missed by a narrow margin the end-March IT on government tax revenue due to lower-than-expected fuel revenues, which was revised up at the time of the first review. Overall nominal revenues, so far in the fiscal year, have been more buoyant than expected at the time of the approval of the SMP.

- *Structural benchmarks (Appendix 1. Table 2)*. Despite the difficult security situation, we have continued to make good progress on structural reform, capacity building, and governance. In late December 2022, we issued a decree making compulsory the use of a unique Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) for all finance departments, with sanctions for fraudulent or non-use, and in April we published the TIN database and the file of active taxpayers. We have also amended the Central Bank Law, thanks to the technical assistance of the Legal Department, which the BRH Board of Directors endorsed in April. The accomplishment of this benchmark was also a key step in implementing the recommendations of the 2019 Safeguards Assessment. We have also revised the AML/CFT legal framework, with the Council of Ministers approving the revisions in late April, in time to meet the end-April 2023 test date.

6. On December 19, 2022, in line with our commitment under the 2022 SMP, we approved the FY2022-23 budget and adopted a medium-term fiscal framework with the NFPS deficit as the main anchor– the first in this country's history. The budget targets a fiscal deficit of less than 1.9 percent of GDP, well below the 2.3 percent of GDP projected at the start of the SMP program. And for the first time, the budget document includes forward estimates of central government revenues and expenditures through 2025. The smaller budget deficit is expected despite additional spending under

the FSW equal to about 0.5 percent of GDP, and monetary financing of the deficit is expected to decline markedly during the fiscal year, mostly reflecting significantly lower budgetary pressure from fuel subsidies. Along with the FY2022-23 budget, we also adopted a new Tax Code and Tax Procedures Code, which simplifies personal and corporate income taxes and eliminates many exemptions, and we have published all the codes and tariffs related to customs. These reforms are expected to enter into force on October 1, 2024.

7. To promote greater transparency and accountability in public spending, we have committed to publish comprehensive monthly reports on budget implementation and will continue to do so, no later than 45 days after the end of each month. We are also committed to conducting internal audits of expenditures by all ministries involved in the use of emergency resources provided under the FSW. We have also requested of the IMF a *Governance Diagnostic,* which should help us identify the next priorities for governance and anti-corruption reforms.

8. We consider that a fuel subsidy reform is essential for ensuring medium-term fiscal sustainability, as discussed at the time of the SMP approval, although the SMP does not [include conditions on the specific timing of the reform. We are taking the lead both in terms of the modalities and timing of the reform considering the political and social implications. The increases in fuel prices in September 2022 have eliminated fuel subsidies for now. For future price adjustments, we intend to implement a comprehensive and transparent policy framework with a predictable and regular automatic pricing mechanism that reflects global market prices changes. Our reform will be accompanied by mitigating measures to protect the most vulnerable.

9. We are committed to avoiding the imposition or intensification of exchange and trade restrictions on making payments and transfers for current international transactions, and to not introducing or modifying any multiple currency practices. And we are committed to limiting foreign exchange intervention only to smoothing excess volatility.

10. In view of the macroeconomic policies, we have implemented to achieve the program’s objectives and our progress on the structural reform agenda, the government requests the completion of the Second Review of the SMP.

Please accept, Madam Managing Director, this expression of our deepest gratitude.

___/s/___	___/s/___
Michel Patrick Boisvert	Jean Baden Dubois
Minister for Economy and Finance	Governor of the Bank of the Republic of Haiti

Appendix I. Table 1. Haiti: Quantitative and Indicative Targets, June 2022–March 2023 1/

	Actual Stock at end- Sep. 2021 2/	Cumulative Flows from September 2021						Actual Stock at end- Sep. 2022 2/	Cumulative Flows from September 2022							
		Dec. 2021	June. 2022				Sept. 2022		Dec. 2022				Mar. 2023			
		Actual	Quantitative target	Actual	Adjusted Actual 3/	Status	Indicative target		Quantitative target	Actual	Adjusted Actual 3/	Status	Indicative target	Actual	Adjusted Actual 3/	Status
I. Periodic quantitative targets																
Net international reserves of central bank (in millions of U.S. dollars) - floor	413.92	27	30	-133.75	-134	Not met	40	186	-10	303	303	Met	10	671	671	Met
Primary balance of the non-financial public sector - floor		-8,813	-20,317	-24,452	-24,452	Not met	-28,860		-14,244	-150	-150	Met	-27,988	9,410	9,410	Met
Net central bank credit to the non-financial public sector - ceiling	172,352	34,564	36,096	41,263	29,022	Met	46,533	216,908	13,295	7,281	7,281	Met	26,090	6,275	6,275	Met
Central Government 4/	162,197	34,564	36,096	44,313	32,072		46,533	194,641	13,295	7,281	7,281		26,090	7,587	7,587	
Other non-financial public sector entities	-2,150	0	0	-3,050	-3,050		0	-3,346	0	0	0		0	-1,251	-1,251	
Budget allocation to MAST for social expenditure - floor 5/		0	3,000	840	840	Not met	3,300		1,500	782	782	Not met	3,500	6,202	6,202	Met
II. Continuous quantitative targets																
Domestic arrears accumulation of the central government	0	0	0	4,200	4,200	Not met	0	0	0	0	0	Met	0	0	0	Met
Public sector external arrears accumulation (in millions of U.S. dollars)	0	0	0	0	0	Met	0	0	0	0	0	Met	0	0	0	Met
New contracting or guaranteeing by the public sector of nonconcessional external debt (in millions of U.S. dollars) - ceiling	0	0	0	0	0	Met	0	0	0	0	0	Met	0	0	0	Met
III. Indicative targets																
Central government fiscal revenue, excluding grants - floor 6/		27,632	93,731	87,747	...	Not met	125,552		32,241	33,040	33,040	Met	85,977	83,275	83,275	Not met
Memorandum items																
External budget support (in millions of U.S. dollars) 7/			9.0	9.0	...		18.1	0.0	0.0	...			19	50 ...		
Gross International Reserves (stock, in millions of U.S. dollars) 8/	2,534	2,547	2,562		...		2,067	2,067	2,325	...			2,332			
(in months of imports of goods and services of the following year)	5.4	5.6	5.5		...		4.1	4.1	4.6	...			4.6			

Sources: Ministry of Finance, Bank of the Republic of Haiti, and Fund staff estimates.

1/ The program includes an adjuster on the NFPS primary balance and NIR target for shortfalls in external budget support lower than the planned amounts. The BRH financing to the Treasury does not include an adjuster. The Quantitative and Indicative Targets (QTs, ITs) are set for end-month, i.e. end-June and end-December for QTs and end-September and end-March for ITs, and in millions of gourdes; unless otherwise indicated.

2/ September 2021 refers to data at the end of FY2021 and September 2022 refers to data at the end of FY2022.

3/ In alignment with the BRH' adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), the BRH and Ministry of Economy and Finance signed a memorandum of understanding, dated June 28, 2022, that recognized additional interest accrued since 2020 on non-negotiable government debt securities held by the BRH. The recognition resulted in an increase in the stock of the BRH' net claims on central government starting with the October 2021 balance sheet. Net central bank credit to the central government has been adjusted downward by 12.241 billion gourde to offset the impact of this recognition, because it represents interest expenses for the 19/20 and 20/21 fiscal years. Adoption of IFRS provides BRH with greater transparency and communication of financial information, aligns it with the best international accounting practices, and a better understanding of how a its financial position may impact the implementation of monetary policy or the policy transmission mechanism.

4/ Excludes SDR allocation and resources freed by IMF CCRT debt relief.

5/ Budget envelope allocated to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (MAST), excluding transfers to the population. The floor corresponds to the sum of both budget allocation (or executed spending if lower) on all social programs in the MAST budget, including resources allocated to/and implemented by the FAES, the Programme d'Urgence (2022), and *Klere Chimen* ; does not preclude other government entities from supporting MAST program implementation.

6/ Includes domestic taxes on corporates, personal income, and sales, and customs duties.

7/ Timing of disbursements is uncertain; annual amount divided by quarter.

8/ For program monitoring purposes, the program exchange rate for the period May 2022 to May 2023 is HTG/US$ 100.0123 (BRH reference rate on December 16, 2021).

Appendix I. Table 2. Haiti: Structural Benchmarks under the SMP

	Measure	Timing	Status	Assessment
	Governance			
1	Publish all public procurement contracts awarded since the publication of the November 2021 procurement decree No. 52, including information on the beneficial owners of successful bidders.	monthly	Met	Published on a regular basis on the website of the National Procurement Commission.
2	Approval by the BRH Board of Directors of draft amendments of the BRH law, prepared in consultation with IMF staff, which: (i) clarifies the objectives of the BRH, (ii) strengthens its autonomy, (iii) enhances its governance, and (iv) improves accountability and transparency.	end-March 2023	Not met	Completed in April.
3	Approval by the Council of Ministers of revisions to the AML/CFT law prepared with Fund TA to address technical deficiencies identified in Haiti's FATF Action Plan and bring it into line with FATF international standards.	end-April 2023	Met	Completed.
	Public Finance Management / Governance			
4	Expand the Treasury Single Account (TSA) at the central bank to include all the central budgetary units, including the emergency fund.	end-Sept. 2022	Not met	Completed in December.
5	Prepare and adopt a medium-term budget framework, for FY2023, FY2024, and FY2025 with the NFPS deficit as the main anchor.	end-Sept. 2022	Not met	Completed in December.
6	Publish quarterly and annual reports on the operations and finances of *Fonds d 'assistance économiques et sociale* (FAES) and reactivate the Governing Board of FAES again with quarterly meetings thereafter.	Quarterly	Met	Completed.
	Tax Policy and Tax/Customs Administration			
7	Conclude public consultations on the tax code and tax procedure code and finalize codes.	end-Sept. 2022	Not met	Completed in December.
8	Publish all codes and tariffs relating to customs.	end-Sept. 2022	Not Met	Completed in December.
9	Issue decree making use of TIN compulsory for all finance departments, with sanctions for fraudulent or non-use, and publish TIN database and file of active taxpayers.	end-March 2023	Not met	Completed in April.
	Safeguards			
10	Complete FY2021 financial audit of BRH and publish the audited financial statements.	end-June 2022	Met	Completed.

Attachment I. Technical Memorandum of Understanding

1. Haiti's performance under the 12-month Staff-Monitored Program (SMP) ending May 31, 2023, will be assessed based on quantitative targets (QTs) and structural benchmarks (SBs). The authorities implemented two prior actions (see MEFP text table). This Technical Memorandum of Understanding (TMU) defines the QTs established by the Haitian authorities and the staff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for monitoring the program. It also defines the arrangements for the transmission of data that will permit staff to monitor program implementation.

A. Definitions

2. Central Government. Unless otherwise indicated, central government refers to the central administration of Haiti and excludes local administrations (municipalities), the central bank (BRH), and other public financial institutions, autonomous state organizations of an administrative, cultural, or scientific nature, and state-owned enterprises. Central government expenditures are financed by domestic taxes and other domestic levies and by foreign donors, through, *inter alia*, foreign grants, ministerial accounts (*comptes courants*), and domestic and foreign public debt.

3. Special funds and programs. These include the Road Fund (*Fonds d'entretien routier, FER*) and the resources mobilized to finance the Universal, Free, and Compulsory Schooling Program (PSUGO) for education, in addition to Treasury transfers. Under the Staff-Monitored Program, the resources levied to finance FER and PSUGO (through the National Education Fund, FNE) will be recorded as central government revenues.

4. Economic and Social Assistance Fund (FAES). FAES is an autonomous state financial entity, currently under the supervision of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. The mission of the FAES is to fund short-term, labor-intensive projects aimed at improving the living conditions of poor people in urban and rural areas and increasing their productive potential. It is responsible for implementing social programs financed by the public Treasury and foreign donors.

5. Office for Monetization of Development Assistance Programs (BMPAD). The BMPAD is an autonomous state administrative organization under the supervision of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. The BMPAD ensures the implementation of grant and/or loan agreements concluded between the government and a donor or foreign lender, as part of the monetization of development aid programs in Haiti. In particular, it finances and monitors approved programs and projects from the funds generated by the monetization of aid in kind.

6. *Electricité d'Haïti* (EDH). EDH is a state-owned enterprise that produces, supplies, and distributes electricity. Flows between EDH and the Central Government (CG) include (i) CG transfers to EDH (including through sales taxes collected on electricity consumption and not devolved to the CG, and the payment of fuel purchase bills); (ii) the payment of letters of credit in favor of independent power producers to settle power generation bills unpaid by EDH; (iii) the payment of bills from independent producers for the purchase of fuel, which are the counterpart of EDH arrears for unpaid generation bills. Under the Staff-Monitored Program, transfers from central government are recorded under operations "above the line," while letters of credit and financial receivables are entered under the operations "below the line."

7. Non-financial public sector (NFPS). The NFPS includes the central government, special funds and programs (defined in paragraph 3), other autonomous state organizations of an administrative, cultural, or scientific nature, including the FAES and the BMPAD (paragraphs 4 and 5), EDH (paragraph 6), the Civil Service Pension Plan and the National Old Age Insurance Office (ONA), and local governments.

8. Public sector (PS). The public sector comprises the nonfinancial public sector, state-owned banks, and nonbank financial SOEs (enterprises over 50 percent state-owned), and the BRH.

9. Budgetary grants. Budgetary grants are grants received from Haiti's bilateral or multilateral partners (including the European Union, the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, the Caribbean Development Bank, and bilateral donors) for general or sector budget support purposes.

B. Quantitative Targets (QT)

10. The implementation of the program will be monitored using the following indicators. Unless otherwise indicated, all QTs will be assessed in terms of cumulated flows from a reference date set at the end of the previous fiscal year (e.g., for fiscal year 2021-2022 the reference date is end-September 2021), as specified in Table 1 of the Memorandum on Economic and Financial Policies.

11. Program exchange rates. For the purposes of the program, all assets, liabilities, and flows denominated in foreign currency will be valued "at the program exchange rates," as defined below, with the exception of elements that affect the government's budgetary accounts, which will be evaluated at current exchange rates. For the purposes of the program, it has been agreed to use the following exchange rates: HTG 100.0123/US$ (BRH reference rate as at December 16, 2021), US$1.133600/EUR and SDR 0.7154070/US$ (rates as at December 16, 2021 published by the IMF on its website - https://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/data/param_rms_mth.aspx).

Net Central Bank Credit to the Nonfinancial Public Sector

12. Net central bank credit to the nonfinancial public sector is defined as the difference between BRH assets and liabilities *vis-à-vis* the nonfinancial public sector (*net claims on the public sector*) according to Standardized Report Forms 1SR or 2SR reported by the BRH to the IMF. This includes the net BRH credit to central government and net BRH credit *vis-à-vis* the rest of the nonfinancial public sector. The calculation of the net BRH credit to the nonfinancial public sector is shown below as of September 30, 2021.

Appendix II. Table 1. Haiti: Components of Net Central Bank Credit to the NFPS

(In millions of gourdes)

	September 2021	June 2022	September 2022	December 2022	March 2023
Net central bank credit to the nonfinancial public sector	**160,047,059.23**	**202,143,310.10**	**216,907,796.47**	**229,435,028.69**	**223,182,962.36**
Net credit on central government	162,196,977.99	181,732,827.46	194,641,384.26	207,903,639.72	202,230,795.64
Claims on central government	200,791,090.44	257,194,431.71	269,884,127.20	287,084,483.25	280,281,880.53
Deposits by government	38,777,196.75	75,461,604.26	75,242,742.94	79,180,843.54	78,051,084.89
Deposits in current accounts	26,730,369.21	36,813,575.11	31,796,307.42	37,204,239.38	35,505,990.16
Sight deposits (HTG)	7,073,003.48	11,406,902.81	10,720,115.47	8,660,112.36	8,097,527.55
Sight deposits (US$)	19,657,365.73	25,406,672.30	21,076,191.95	28,544,127.02	27,408,462.61
Securities seized UCREF	594.75	594,748.67	594,748.67	594,748.67	594,748.67
Sundry accounts payable	636,307.08	6,097.41	7,233.00	352.15	33,912.85
Certified checks	329,125.56	371,109.60	286,815.46	420,057.43	433,374.37
Certified bank checks	25,041.45	25,041,448.88	25,043,228.88	25,041,448.88	25,041,448.88
Foreign Debt Special Fund	55,669.97	194,883.78	117,742.54	87,072.38	157,727.34
Internal Public Debt Special Fund			3,037,241.08	1,923.08	-
Treasury special accounts	6,762,697.60	10,361,354.81	12,201,556.37	13,134,148.93	13,495,990.60
Civil pension – investments transaction	375,029.84	561,067.48	583,394.69	734,303.46	775,901.20
IMF debt relief after disaster	2,410,591.87	1,907,738.95	1,965,245.23	2,398,082.26	2,508,910.19
Minus: Deposits from autonomous agencies (ONA)	276,996.07	390,420.44	390,990.39	435,533.09	496,919.37
Net credit to the rest of the nonfinancial public sector	-2,149,918.76	-5,200,078.71	-3,346,147.14	-4,079,172.38	-4,597,008.35
Claims on the rest of the nonfinancial public sector	610,420.96	1,274,612.09	1,563,886.60	1,552,168.80	1,537,198.42
Deposits by the rest of the nonfinancial public sector	2,760,339.72	6,474,690.80	4,910,033.74	5,631,341.18	6,134,206.77
Deposits by autonomous agencies (ONA) (HTG and US$)	276,996.07	390,420.44	390,990.39	435,533.09	435,533.09
Local government deposits (sight deposits and certified checks)	489,202.33	967,138.58	747,632.79	702,627.07	471,181.47
Deposits by state-owned enterprises (sight deposits in gourdes and US$ and certified checks)	1,994,141.32	5,117,131.78	3,771,410.56	4,493,181.03	5,227,492.22

Net International Reserves

13. The gross international reserves of the central bank are those external assets that are readily available to and controlled by monetary authorities for meeting balance of payments financing needs, for intervention in exchange markets to affect the exchange rate, and for other related purposes such as maintaining confidence in the currency and the economy, and serving as a basis for foreign borrowing. Reserve assets must be foreign currency assets and assets that actually exist. All contingent assets are excluded. Underlying the concept of reserve assets are the notions of 'availability for use' and 'control' by the monetary authorities.[1] The gross international reserves reported by the BRH from Standardized Report Forms 1SR or 2SR must conform to this definition. They include monetary gold, liquid assets, including holdings of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), and IMF reserve position. Swaps in foreign currency with domestic financial institutions and pledged or otherwise encumbered reserve assets are excluded from gross international reserves.

14. The net international reserves of the BRH are defined as the gross international reserve of the BRH, minus (i) gross external liabilities excluding allocations of special drawing rights and liabilities related to Haiti's participation in the capital of international financial institutions, (ii) foreign currency deposits of commercial banks at the BRH (*sight deposits in US dollars and euro from BCM to BRH, and the CAM transfer*), (iii) commitments related to foreign currency swap transactions, (iv) *special foreign currency accounts*, and (v) *project accounts*, all from Standardized Report Forms 1SR or 2SR with the exception of the balances of the IMF accounts (SDR holding, reserve position in the IMF, and liabilities to the IMF), which come from the IMF Finance Department. The calculation of BRH net international reserves is illustrated below.

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[1] See *Balance of Payments Manual,* http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bop/2007/bopman6.htm and *Guidelines for a Data Template*
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/ir/IRProcessWeb/pdf/guide2013.pdf.

Appendix II. Table 2. Haiti: Calculation of BRH Net International Reserves

(In thousands)

	September 2021 (gourdes)	September 2021 (US$)[1]	June 2022 (gourdes)	June 2022 (US$)[1]	September 2022 (gourdes)	September 2022 (US$)[1, 2]
BRH gross international reserves					**243,268,752.78**	**243,268,752.78**
Gold holdings	9,880,753.71	98,795.39	11,973,510.09	119,720.38	11,412,086.84	112,977.20
Foreign currency	5,998,299.64	59,975.62	3,648,143.51	36,476.95	4,626,623.31	45,802.57
Foreign sight deposits	24,302,710.70	242,997.22	19,972,438.93	199,699.83	16,450,821.02	162,859.58
Investments abroad	189,797,159.80	1,897,738.18	196,580,981.41	1,965,568.05	193,091,082.97	1,911,560.11
SDRs holdings (according to IMF books)	13,972,219.51	139,705.01	15,047,009.07	150,451.59	14,514,617.83	143,691.59
IMF reserve position (based on IMF books)	2,818,820.50	28,184.74	3,161,513.40	31,611.25	3,094,766.71	30,637.52
Minus: Foreign liabilities	*70,137,904.62*	*701,292.79*	*75,598,035.47*	*755,887.38*	*68,823,699.75*	*688,152.35*
Of which: Foreign liabilities (excluding liabilities related to Haiti's participation in the capital of international financial institutions)	*8,518,510.82*	*85,174.63*	*1,645,925.76*	*16,457.23*	1,652,381.92	*16,358.22*
Debt service payment to PDVSA	*42,558,855.10*	*425,536.21*	*53,576,083.08*	*535,694.94*	*47,334,516.73*	*473,286.953*
Off-balance-sheet foreign currency liabilities	*1,460,675.36*	*14,604.96*	*1,738,342.54*	*17,381.29*	*1,765,326.81*	*17,476.35*
Liabilities to the IMF (based on IMF books)	*17,599,863.34*	*175,976.99*	*18,637,684.09*	*186,353.92*	*18,067,971.28*	*178,869.02*
Minus: Deposits in foreign currency	*129,098,781.43*	*1,290,829.04*	*139,537,396.50*	*1,395,202.36*	*148,557,706.71*	*1,470,689.28*
Minus: Foreign currency swap transactions	*6,002,703.60*	*60,019.65*	*7,088,348.85*	*70,874.77*	*7,370,423.81*	*72,965.61*
Minus: Special accounts in foreign currency	*133,391.45*	*1,333.75*	*139,470.08*	*1,394.53*	*132,421.50*	*1,310.94*
Minus: Project accounts	*67.74*	*0.68*	*71.34*	*0.71*	*68.92*	*0,68*
Net international reserves of the BRH	**41,397,115.02**	**413,920.24**	**28,020,274.18**	**280,168.28**	**18,613,956.26**	**186,116.67**

[1] Exchange rate: HTG 100,0123/US$.

[2] Debt service payment to PDVSA equals the amount in escrow account. Haiti has had difficulties processing payments to Venezuela for debts incurred under the Petrocaribe agreement owing to international sanctions. Debt service payments to Venezuela are being placed in an escrow account in U.S. dollars held at the BRH.

Appendix II. Table 2. Haiti: Calculation of BRH Net International Reserves (Concluded)
(In thousands)

	December 2022 (gourdes)	December 2022 (US$)[1, 2]	March 2023 (gourdes)	March 2023 (US$)[1, 2]
BRH gross international reserves	**316,451,257.94**	**3,132,799.25**	**366,494,781.48**	**3,628,219.35**
Gold holdings	15,348,726.46	151,949.08	17,430,730.50	172,560.48
Foreign currency	2,641,945.85	26,154.69	2,014,247.53	19,940.62
Foreign sight deposits	32,399,607.01	320,749.13	56,736,180.09	561,675.96
Investments abroad	244,288,639.59	2,418,404.88	267,302,901.83	2,646,241.12
SDRs holdings (according to IMF books)	17,800,956.34	176,225.63	18,758,031.55	185,700.47
IMF reserve position (based on IMF books)	3,971,382.69	39,315.83	4,252,689.98	42,100.71
Minus: Foreign liabilities	*74,731,137.84*	*747,219.47*	*78,096,292.51*	*780,866.88*
Of which: Foreign liabilities (excluding liabilities related to Haiti's participation in the capital of international financial institutions)	*1,965,536.24*	*19,458.39*	*2,018,145.14*	*19,979.20*
Debt service payment to PDVSA	*48,095,651.71*	*480,897.37*	*49,824,567.07*	*498,184.39*
Off-balance-sheet foreign currency liabilities	*2,177,658.89*	*21,558.35*	*2,303,604.88*	*22,805.19*
Liabilities to the IMF (based on IMF books)	*22,492,291.00*	*222,668.83*	*23,949,975.43*	*237,099.60*
Minus: Deposits in foreign currency	*183,987,384.45*	*1,821,435.45*	*193,901,818.08*	*1,919,586.21*
Minus: Foreign currency swap transactions	*8,665,446.01*	*85,786.05*	*8,580,317.81*	*84,943.30*
Minus: Special accounts in foreign currency	*178,400.15*	*1,766.12*	*189,537.18*	*1,876.38*
Minus: Project accounts	*77.47*	*0.77*	*79.66*	*0.79*
Net international reserves of the BRH	**48,888,812.01**	**488,827.99**	**85,726,736.23**	**857,161.93**

15. Interventions of the BRH in the foreign exchange market are defined in the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies.

16. If budgetary grants are lower than expected the floor on net international reserves will be adjusted downwards by the amount of the difference in question. Conversely, the floor will not be adjusted upwards by the amount of budgetary grants exceeding the expected levels mentioned in the table below.

Appendix II. Table 3. Haiti: Projected Budgetary Grants
(In millions of US dollars)

Cumulative flows since end-September 2021				Cumulative flows since end-September 2022			
Dec. 2021	March 2022	June 2022	Sept. 2022	Dec. 2022	March 2023	June 2023	Sept. 2023
15.2	15.2	45.7	60.9	24.7	49.5	-	-

Primary Balance of the Nonfinancial Public Sector

17. Domestic arrears of the central government refer to expenditure accepted by the Treasury and unpaid after 90 days, despite the delivery of the corresponding goods and services. Domestic arrears of central government do not include unpaid off-budget government commitments.

18. Unpaid off-budget central government commitments refer to liabilities incurred outside the budgetary process (from ministries or other public bodies), which may give rise to contingent claims against central government resources.

19. Net domestic financing of the nonfinancial public sector (NFPS) corresponds to the sum of the following elements: (i) net central bank credit to the NFPS; (ii) net credit from domestic commercial banks to the NFPS (as reported in the Standardized Report Form 2SR), which includes changes in NFPS deposits and the net issuance of Treasury bills and other NFPS securities to commercial banks; and (iii) net nonbank credit to the NFPS, which includes the net issuance of Treasury bills and other NFPS securities to nonbank institutions, the change in the net position of the NFPS vis-à-vis the electricity sector (including independent power producers), and the net change in suppliers' credit and domestic arrears of central government.

20. Net external financing of the nonfinancial public sector (NFPS) corresponds to the sum of (i) new external loan disbursements (excluding IMF loans) and (ii) the net change in external arrears minus external loan amortizations.

21. For the purposes of the program, the **primary balance of the nonfinancial public sector (NFPS)** corresponds to the sum of the following: net domestic financing of the NFPS and net external financing of the NFPS, after deducting interest payments on public debt. If budgetary grants do not reach the expected levels, the floor on the primary balance of the NFPS includes an asymmetric adjuster. More specifically, if the amounts of budgetary support are in deficit, the floors on the primary balance will be reduced by the amount of those deficits. Conversely, if external budget support exceeds projections, the floor on the primary balance will not change.

Budget Allocation to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor

22. The budget allocation to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (MAST) for social expenditure is defined as the sum (excluding transfers to the population) of the budget allocation (or expenditure implemented if lower) for all social programs of the MAST budget, including the resources allocated and implemented by the FAES, the Emergency Program (2022), *Klere Chimen*, and the activities of the Office of the State Secretary for Disability Inclusion (BSEIPH). It should be noted that this does not prevent other government entities from supporting the implementation of MAST programs. **The floor on the QT** applies to the sum of the allocations mentioned.

New Contracting or Guaranteeing by the Public Sector of Non-Concessional External Debt

23. Definition of debt. The definition of debt is set in paragraph 8 of the Guidelines on Public Debt Conditionality in Fund Arrangements, adopted by Decision No. 16919-(20/103) of the Executive Board (October 28, 2020). For the purpose of these guidelines, the term “debt” will be understood to mean a current, i.e., not contingent, liability, created under a contractual arrangement through the provision of value in the form of assets (including currency) or services, and which requires the obligor to make one or more payments in the form of assets (including currency) or services, at some future point(s) in time; these payments will discharge the principal and/or interest liabilities incurred under the contract. Debts can take a number of forms, the primary ones being as follows:

i. loans, i.e., advances of money to the obligor by the lender made on the basis of an undertaking that the obligor will repay the funds in the future (including deposits, bonds, debentures, commercial loans and buyers’ credits) and temporary exchanges of assets that are equivalent to fully collateralized loans under which the obligor is required to repay the funds, and usually pay interest, by repurchasing the collateral from the buyer in the future (such as repurchase agreements and official swap arrangements);

ii. suppliers’ credits, i.e., contracts where the supplier permits the obligor to defer payments until some time after the date on which the goods are delivered or services are provided; and

iii. leases, i.e., arrangements under which property is provided which the lessee has the right to use for one or more specified period(s) of time that are usually shorter than the total expected service life of the property, while the lessor retains the title to the property. For the purpose of these guidelines, the debt is the PV (at the inception of the lease) of all lease payments expected to be made during the period of the agreement excluding those payments that cover the operation, repair, or maintenance of the property.

24. Gross **public debt** is debt owned by Nonfinancial public sector and comprised the advances by the *Banque de la République d’Haiti* (BRH) to the government (see Debt Sustainably Analysis).

25. Debt guarantees by the public sector. For the purposes of the program, a debt guarantee by the public sector means an explicit legal obligation to service a debt in the event of non-payment by the borrower (in return for payment in cash or in kind).

26. Concessional debt. An external debt is considered concessional if it includes a grant element of at least 35 percent.[10]

27. External public debt. This is the debt of the public sector which is contacted or serviced vis-à-vis non-residents. It includes, where applicable, debt issued domestically by the government and held by non-residents. This TMU assumes that non-residents do not hold debt issued domestically by the public sector. The stock of external debt will be adjusted if new information becomes available.

28. The central government undertakes not to contract or guarantee any new non-concessional external debt. This quantitative target also applies to domestic debt. It also applies to any private debt guaranteed by the central government that constitutes a contingent liability. Excluded from the ceiling are short-term (with a maturity of less than one year) import-related credits, rescheduling arrangements, borrowing from the IMF, non-resident purchases of treasury bills, and gourde-denominated BRH bills that are indexed to the exchange rate. This quantitative target will be monitored continuously by the authorities and any non-observance will be immediately report to the Fund.

Public Sector External Arrears Accumulation

29. Arrears on external debt of the public sector. They include all debt-service obligations (principal and interest) on loans contracted or guaranteed by the public sector that are due to non-residents but not paid on the due date as set out in the loan contract; they exclude those arising from obligations being renegotiated with external creditors and (or) those that are litigious. For the purpose of assessing the quantitative target on the non-accumulation of new external debt arrears by the public sector, arrears resulting from non-payment of debt service due to international sanctions preventing payments to the creditor are excluded from the previous definition. This quantitative target will be monitored continuously by the authorities and any non-observance will be immediately report to the Fund.

Domestic Arrears Accumulation of the Central Government

30. Arrears on domestic debt of the central government. They include all debt-service obligations (principal and interest) on loans contracted or guaranteed by the central government that are due to residents but not paid 90 days after the due date set out in the loan contract. The

[10] A tool to calculate the grant element of a wide range of financial packages is available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/conc/calculator/

quantitative target on domestic arrears accumulation will be monitored continuously by the authorities and any non-observance will be immediately report to the Fund.

C. Reporting of Data for the Monitoring of the Program

31. In order to facilitate monitoring of the program, the government will provide IMF staff with the information set out in the following summary table. Any data revisions will be promptly communicated to IMF staff.

32. The authorities will inform IMF staff in writing at least 10 working days (excluding public holidays in Haiti) before any change in economic and financial policies that may affect the outcome of the program. Such policies include, for example, changes in tax or customs legislation, wage policy, and support for public or private enterprises. With respect to continuous QTs, the authorities will report any non-observance to the IMF promptly.

Appendix II. Table 4. Haiti: Summary of Data to be Provided			
Sector	**Type of data**	**Frequency**	**Reporting deadline**
Real Sector			
	National accounts	Annual	Year-end + 3 months
	Quarterly economic indicators (economic cycle)	Quarterly	Quarter-end + 2 months
	Consumer price index (including breakdowns)	Monthly	Month-end + 3 weeks
Public Finances			
	Fiscal revenues (internal, external, other)	Monthly	Month-end + 1 week (4 final weeks final data)
	Expenditures on Cash Basis (wages and salaries, goods and services, external debt, current accounts)	Monthly	Month-end + 1 week (4 final weeks final data)
	Table of government financial transactions (TOFE)	Monthly	Month-end + 2 weeks
	Balance on current accounts and operation of projects	Monthly	Month-end + one month
	Table Underlying TOFE, which enables the determination of checks in circulation and balance on investment project accounts	Monthly	Month-end + one month
	Table on budget implementation with breakdown by ministry and other bodies and by type of expenditure	Monthly	Month-end + one month
	Total monthly amount of expenditure executed by transfer letters	Monthly	Month-end + one month
	Report on Revenue Collection of DGI (progress report)	Monthly	Month-end + one month
	Tables of revenue collection of AGD (port activity indicators, analytical report of customs receipts on import)	Monthly	Month-end + one month
	Table of revenue collected and authorized expenditure (TEREDA)	Monthly	Month-end + one month
	Detailed revenue and expenditures of BMPAD	Quarterly	Quarter-end + one month
	Report on social protection expenditures	Quarterly	30-day lag (final data)
	Table on the implementation of the PSUGO program	Quarterly	30-day lag (final data)
	Dashboard of the state electricity utility EDH showing monthly information on the production of electricity, making explicit the composition of production by independent electricity producers, EDH, and by region.	Monthly	30-day lag (final data)
	EDH commercial data allowing the calculation of EDH's billing and collection rates	Monthly	Month-end + one week
	EDH cash data including all revenues and all expenditures (operating, investment, and other)	Monthly	Month-end + one month
	Information on any off-budget claims presented for payment	Monthly	Month-end + one month

Appendix II. Table 4. Haiti: Summary of Data to be Provided (Continued)

	Stock of unpaid off-budget central government liabilities	Monthly	Month-end + one month
	Data on all fuel shipments per product giving the CIF import price, the full price structure (including stabilization margin) and import and consumption quantities. Data on actual collections for each month with a breakdown per product and tax type.	Monthly	Month-end + one week
	Table of import prices of petroleum products, by arrival	Monthly	Month-end + one month
	Table of imported quantities of petroleum products	Monthly	Month-end + one month
	"Stabilization margin" table of the Directorate of the Tax Inspectorate	Monthly	Month-end + one month
	"Petroleum product tax" table of the Directorate of the Tax Inspectorate	Monthly	Month-end + one month
	Details of the stock of all government borrowing and debt securities (interest rate, maturity, creditor if known)	Annual	End of financial year + 3 months
	Full amortization table of domestic and external government debt	Annual	End of financial year + 3 months
	Statement of stocks and flows of repayment of suppliers' credits and payment arrears	Monthly	Month-end + one week
Monetary and Financial Data			
	Exchange rate	Daily	Day-end + one day
	Monetary base and sources thereof and currency in circulation.	Weekly	Week-end + one week
	Aide Memoire Table containing, inter alia: (i) stock of BRH bonds; (ii) deposits at commercial banks; (iii) credit to private sector (in gourdes and U.S. dollars); (iv) details of inflows and outflows of foreign exchange reserves, including budget support received; (v) volume of foreign exchange transactions, including BRH sales and purchases; (vi) gross and net international reserves; (vii) net BRH credit to central government and the non-financial public sector; and stocks and interest rates of BRH bills.	Weekly	Week-end + one week
	Tables of monetary statistics showing, inter alia, the balance sheet of the BRH (Table Standardized Report Form-1SR) and the consolidated banking sector (Table Standardized Report Form -2SR)	Monthly	Month-end + one month
	IMF Weekly Tables showing, inter alia, the average and weighted interest rates on gourde and U.S. dollar-denominated deposits and credit, and the excess reserves in the banking system.	Monthly	Month-end + one month

Appendix II. Table 4. Haiti: Summary of Data to be Provided (Concluded)

	Monetary and financial statistics. Standardized reporting form, balance sheets of the Central Bank and other depository corporations.	Monthly	Month-end + one month
	Information on the composition of gross reserves.	Monthly	Month-end + one month
	Banking supervision statistics and commercial indicators on commercial banks.	Quarterly	Quarter-end + one month
	The calendar and planned placements of BRH gourde-denominated dollar-indexed bills, including in banks and nonbanks.	Quarterly	Quarter-end + one month
	Audited financial statements of the BRH	Annual	Year-end + 3 months
Balance of Payments			
	Balance of payments (first version)	Quarterly	Quarter-end + 6 weeks
	Revised balance of payments	Quarterly	3 months after the first reporting
	BRH FX cash flow table; quarterly projections through end of fiscal year.	Quarterly	Quarter-end + one month
External Debt			
	External debt report prepared by the BRH showing monthly disbursements; debt service, debt forgiveness and rescheduling, arrears, and debt stocks.	Monthly	Month-end + one month
	Details of any external public debt and debt guaranteed by the State	Monthly	Month-end + one month
	Data on stocks, accumulation, and repayment of external arrears	Monthly	Month-end + 6 weeks
	Table of complete amortization of external debt	Annual	End of financial year + 3 months
	International Investment Position (IIP)	Annual	Year-end + 3 months